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Summary	  	  
In this thesis we study how multinational companies are using various strategies in order to 
minimize their total tax burden. We use theory and relevant literature to describe some of the 
strategies available, and we also confirm that these strategies are in fact being used on a 
global scale.  
By studying two of the largest companies in the world, respectively The Coca-Cola 
Company and IKEA, we are able to see how some of these strategies are used in real life. By 
studying these two companies, we find that both show signs indicating an aggressive use of 
tax minimization strategies. The lack of transparency and the complicated organizational 
structures we have found are both clear indications that aggressive tax planning is being 
used. By locating the concentrate operation in a tax haven, we believe that The Coca-Cola 
Company is able to keep massive amounts of income outside of the United States, free of 
tax. This strategy is possible by having the parent located in Delaware, a high secrecy 
jurisdiction known for offering easy access to tax havens. Tax havens and high secrecy 
jurisdictions are also common denominators for IKEA´s corporate structure, which includes 
both a foundation and holding companies located in tax havens such as the Netherlands, The 
Netherlands Antilles and Luxembourg. By funnelling royalty payments through shell 
companies and into holding companies in tax havens, as well as shifting profits away from 
high tax jurisdictions by using aggressive transfer pricing and internal debt; we believe that 
the companies able to save massive amounts of taxes.  
The problem of companies being able to avoid taxes is the result of a malfunctioning global 
tax system, where various loopholes are easy to exploit. The lack of a common 
understanding between all jurisdictions, where some deviate from the others in order to 
increase income, is a problem that needs to be solved. As we describe in the last chapter of 
our thesis, several actions have been and are to be taken in order to prevent companies from 
dodging taxes. Most countries are now on board for a new global transparency agreement, 
and there is reason to believe that we will see changes in the near future, hopefully 
increasing the total amount of tax paid at a global scale.  
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1. Introduction 
Today we observe a growing media attention regarding multinational companies and their 
tax minimization strategies. Large multinational companies such as GE, Apple and 
Starbucks, have been confronted and asked to justify their company structures and their 
effective tax rates, based on suspicions of aggressive use of tax planning. 
The recent financial crises, followed by recession in several economies worldwide, have 
increased awareness of actors who fail to contribute to society in the form of paying their 
taxes. When companies dodge taxes, the remaining companies, as well as the households, 
pay the price in the form of increased taxes and reduced welfare. Thus, this problem affects 
everyone.  
We will in this chapter study multinational corporations (MNCs) and describe the various 
tax minimization strategies available to them. By studying relevant literature and empirical 
analyses, we hope to confirm that companies worldwide are in fact using these strategies.  
By studying two MNCs, respectively The Coca-Cola Company and IKEA, we hope to get a 
better view of how the strategies are being used by a company in a real life setting. We hope 
to be able to confirm that the two companies are in fact using some of the strategies 
explained, and we might also be able to estimate the effect of these various actions.  
We chose to study these exact companies because of their respective sizes and positions 
internationally, and the suspicions aimed at them regarding their low tax payments. While 
IKEA is mentioned frequently in the media regarding their business structure, Coca-Cola has 
somehow been able to fly under the radar, and has succeeded in not drawing to much 
attention towards its tax planning regime. This made us curious, and we wanted to put the 
companies under the loop to see what we could find.  
The thesis starts by explaining MNCs and how they are built up. We then move on to 
international tax systems and the regulations in relevant jurisdictions, before explaining the 
various strategies and analysing relevant literature to see if these are being used. The two 
companies are then analysed thoroughly, before we end the thesis by looking at various 
government actions aimed to prevent tax minimization.  
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2. Multinational companies and capital structure 
This chapter will focus on how multinational companies (MNCs) set their capital structure, 
which will be highly relevant when we are to analyse The Coca-Cola Company and IKEA. 
Firms issue a collection of securities to raise capital from investors. The composition of the 
securities constitutes the firm’s capital structure. The most common securities are equity and 
debt1. If a firm chooses to have a composition solely based on equity, the firm is said to be 
unlevered. If a firm chooses to have a combination of equity and debt, the amount of debt 
determines the company’s leverage. A MNC will have to find an optimal capital structure at 
corporate level, taking into account the various jurisdictions in which it operates, and their 
laws and regulations. We will start by explaining what signifies a MNC.  
	  
 Multinational companies (MNCs) 2.1
There are several definitions of a MNC, which include factors such as ownership, 
management, strategy or structure. A simple definition is that a company is multinational 
when it operates and sells goods and services in more than one country2. Due to the 
increased mobility of capital that has been observed over the last decades, the number of 
MNCs has increased through this very same timeline. There are several operational upsides 
in changing a company’s status to become a MNC, such as: Increased revenue potential, 
cheaper labour (i.e. lower costs) and cheaper raw material. This thesis will however focus on 
advantages linked to the capital structure of the MNC. 
	  
                                                
1 Berk & DeMarzo. 2011 
2 Shapiro & Sarin, 2010 
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 Capital structure in MNCs 2.2
A MNC chooses a capital structure that maximizes the company´s global profit. Since a 
subsidiary can either be financed with equity or debt, the management chooses a capital 
structure taking into consideration certain trade-offs between the sources. Jurisdictions are 
practicing different laws of how to tax different sources of financing. 
 
2.2.1 Tax efficient financial structure3 
MNCs have distinctive features that a regular one-jurisdiction company doesn’t have. It 
faces international tax-rate-differences, which gives it the ability to shift debt across 
affiliates (both external and internal) and use internal debt for tax reasons4. The following 
model will show how a MNC maximize worldwide profit. 
𝐸! 	   Equity	   	   𝑏!! ≡ 𝐷!!𝐾! 	   Internal	  leverage	  𝐷!!/! 	   Internal/	  External	  debt	   	   𝑏! ≡ 𝑏!! + 𝑏!!	   Leverage	  ratio	  in	  affiliate	  i	  𝑏!! ≡ 𝐷!!𝐾! 	   External	  leverage	   	   𝑟 ∗ 𝐷!! = 𝑏!! ∗ 𝑟 ∗ 𝐾! = 0!! 	   Internal	  lending	  constraint	  is	  equal	  to	  zero	  
	   Figure	  2.1	  
	  
	  
There are costs associated when affiliates are undertaking both external and internal debt. 
The external debt has a U-shaped cost function, 𝐶!(𝑏!!) whereas the internal debt cost 
function can be written as  𝐶!(𝑏!!). On the parent level, the bankruptcy costs depend on firm-
wide leverage𝑏! = !!!! !!! . Note that there is not an overall parent-level cost on internal debt as 
figure 3.1 shows that   𝑟 ∗ 𝐷!! = 𝑏!! ∗ 𝑟 ∗ 𝐾! = 0!! . The cost function for the firm wide 
leverage is  𝐶! 𝑏!  Møen, Schindler, Schjelderup and Tropina (2011) define the economic 
profit in affiliate i,  𝜋!!, as: 
                                                
3 This paragraph is based on Møen et al. 2011 and Debt shifting and ownership strutuce. Dirk Schindler and Guttorm 
Schjelderup (2012) in a lecture given by Guttorm Schjelderup and Dirk Schindler in the course Taxes and Business 
Strategies (FIE441) at NHH – Norwegian School of Economics, spring 2013.  
4 Since a one-jurisdiction company doesn’t face different tax rates, there is no tax gains by shifting internal debt 
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𝜋!! = 𝐹 𝐾! , 𝐿! − 𝑤 ∗ 𝐿! − 𝑟 + 𝐶! 𝑏!! +   𝐶! 𝑏!! ∗ 𝐾! 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (2.1)	  
And the taxable profit in affiliate i,  𝜋!! as: 𝜋!! = 𝐹 𝐾! , 𝐿! − 𝑤 ∗ 𝐿! − 𝑟 ∗ 𝐷!! + 𝐷!! − 𝐶! 𝑏!! +  𝐶! 𝑏!! ∗ 𝐾! 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (2.2)	  
The after tax profit in affiliate i, 𝜋!, is the affiliate’s economic profit minus the taxes of the 
taxable profit. Since a firm is interested in optimizing its worldwide profit it will maximize 
this by choosing the leverage, which gives the optimal capital structure. Dividing with 
respect to external debt and the internal debt gives5: 
!"!"!! = 𝑡! ∗ 𝑟 = 1− 𝑡! ∗ !!! !!!!!!! + !  !! !!!! ∗ !!!! > 0	  and,	  
!"!"!! = 𝑡! − 𝜆 ∗ 𝑟 = 1− 𝑡! ∗ !!! !!!!!!! 	  	  
There are certain implications attached to the formulas above. Due to the tax benefit, the 
internal bank is located in the lowest-tax affiliate. The external leverage and the financial 
structure are affected by tax rates, cost of capital, bankruptcy costs on the affiliate and the 
parent level. The external debt is not affected by the company’s internal bank or the internal 
debt-to-asset ratio. The internal leverage is affected by the affiliate’s corporate tax rate, cost 
of capital, concealment costs and the tax rate in the group’s internal bank. 
 
2.2.2 Debt versus the share price 
As discussed, MNCs can use internal debt in order to avoid tax obligations by utilizing 
differences in international tax rates. As tax obligations decrease, earnings increase. 
John P. Kennedy, partner at Deloitte Tax LLP, speaking at a conference in Philadelphia Nov. 
3rd 2010, gave the following example to show the CFO’s and other option holding managers 
incentive to rig the company’s capital structure favouring tax avoidance; 
                                                
5 Møen et al. 2011 
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For a hypothetical company that has 1,000 shares outstanding, has pretax 
income of $5,000 and trades at 20 times earnings, cutting just 2 percentage 
points off the rate could drive the share price up $2.6 
Minority owners will benefit from holding shares in borrowing affiliates due to its tax 
savings (Schindler and Schjelderup (2012)). Since parts of the tax engineered profit fall on 
the minority owners and not the parent company, wholly owned affiliates use more internal 
debt than affiliates with minority owners (Schindler and Schjelderup (2012)). For wholly 
owned affiliates in emerging markets of multinationals, their debt-to-asset ratio increases by 
27 percentage points given a 10% increase in its corporate tax rate.7 The same review does 
not find any evidence of debt shifting for partially owned affiliates. It goes to say that 
affiliates with minority owners are also less tax sensitive and that wholly owned subsidiaries 
have a 5 percentage points higher leverage ratio of internal debt compared to non-majority 
owned.8 Schindler and Schjelderup (2012) present the worldwide profits of a MNC with 
minority owners with the formula:  = (1− 𝐽!)(𝜋! − 𝑡! ∗ 𝜋!!)!! 	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (2.3)	  
Where 𝐽! is the minority shareholders contribution. 
Although it relies on linear profit sharing rules, it shows how the minority ownership in 
country i reduces the profit income in country i for the MNC. 
                                                
6 Drucker, 2010  
7 Weichenrieder, A.J., 2010 
8 Büttner, 2007  
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 Tax efficient capital structures in Multinationals 2.3
2.3.1 Debt tax shield effects 
Møen, Schindler, Schjeldrup and Tropina (2011) shows that there are three debt tax shield 
effects that MNCs can use. They define the drivers behind the total debt to asset ratio, b!, of 
an affiliate with the formula below9. 
𝑏! = 𝛽! + 𝛽! ∙ 𝑡! + 𝛽! ∙ 𝑝! 𝑡! − 𝑡! + 𝛽! ∙ 𝑡! − 𝑡!!!! ,∀  𝑖 > 1	  	  	  	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (2.4)	  
The following paragraphs will explain each driver and the three mechanism of this formula. 
The standard debt tax shield 
𝑏!!"!"#!$#  !"#$  !"#  !!!"#$ = 𝛽! + 𝛽! ∙ 𝑡! 	  
𝛽! = 𝜇 ∙ 𝑏∗𝜇 + 𝛾 ,𝛽! = 𝑟𝜇 + 𝛾	  
Figure	  2.2	  
In chapter 2 we elaborate the effects of the standard debt tax shield. We can see that the size 
of the tax shield is affected by the corporate tax rate in affiliate i and will increase along with 
the tax shield until the FOC = 0 when  𝑏!! > 0.	  
External	  debt	  shifting	  mechanism	  
Figure	  2.3	  
MNCs will allocate external debt in those affiliates that produce the highest absolute tax 
savings hence those with the highest effective corporate tax rate10 relatively to the affiliate 
                                                
9 Møen et al. 2011 
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with the lowest effective corporate tax rate. Other	   effects	   of	   leverage	   are	   the	   decreased	  
level	   of	   free	   cash	   flow11	   forcing	   managers	   to	   run	   the	   firm	   as	   efficiently	   increasing	   the	  
productivity.12	  	  
Internal	  debt	  shifting	  mechanism	  
Figure	  2.4	  
The internal debt shifting mechanism affects the total debt-to-asset ratio through internal 
debt. MNCs can exploit this by maximizing the tax rate gap between the affiliates and the 
company’s internal bank (i.e. locate the internal bank in the jurisdiction with the lowest tax 
rate). By doing so, company i deducts a higher level of interest payments than 
company/internal bank 1 has in taxable payments provided that  𝑡! ≠ 𝑡!. The MNC will 
therefore have incentives to increase the debt-to-asset ratios in the high tax affiliates.13 
 Minority ownership structure 2.4
In regard of the two companies in this thesis, there is one main difference in the ownership 
structure that is not directly associated with holding, royalty and interest conduit structures. 
The Coca-Cola Company (KO) has minority owners, meaning they are on the stock 
exchange and could be bought by anybody.  
A minority ownership is when: 
• Joint ventures or diversified investors hold shares in the company. 
                                                                                                                                                 
10 Formula standard debt shield proves that corporate tax rates affect tax savings 
11 As the debt-to-asset ratio increases we assume that interest payments increases as well implying that the access to free 
cash flow decreases  
12Berk, J. & DeMarzo, 2011 
13 Møen et al. 2011 
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• The multinational fully controls its affiliates (Total share of minority owners < 50%) 	  
	  
2.4.1 Tax-efficient structure with minority shareholding 
We assume that there are no overall bankruptcy costs on parent level (𝐶! = 0), the sum of 
minority shares in affiliate 𝑖 is given by  𝐽!, market entry costs 𝐶!!(𝐽𝑖) which are decreasing 
with minority shares !"!!!"# < 0 and      !!!!!  !"# < 0.  
Setting	  up	  the	  economic	  profit	  in	  affiliate  𝑖:	  
𝜋!! = 𝐹 𝐾! , 𝐿! − 𝑤!×𝐿! − 𝐾! 𝑟 + 𝐶! 𝑏!! + 𝐶! 𝑏!! − 𝐶!!(𝐽𝑖)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   (2.5)	  
Production factors are real capital - 𝐾! and labor - 𝐿!. The production function: 𝑥! =𝐹 𝐾! , 𝐿!  (with decreasing marginal productivities in each factor). External debt cost 
function (agency costs) is given by 𝐶! 𝑏!!  and internal debt cost function (concealment 
costs) 𝐶! 𝑏!! . The wage rate is set by 𝑤! and the rental cost of capital per unit, 𝑟.  
Taxable	  profit	  in	  affiliate  𝑖:	  
𝜋!! = 𝐹 𝐾! , 𝐿! − 𝑤!×𝐿! − 𝐾! 𝑟(𝑏!! + 𝑏!!)+ 𝐶! 𝑏!! + 𝐶! 𝑏!! − 𝐶!!(𝐽𝑖)	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (2.6)	  
 
2.4.2 Profit maximizing financial structure   𝑝 = (1− 𝐽!)(𝜋!! − 𝑡!𝜋!!)!!!! 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (2.7)	  
where 𝜋!! is the economic profit in subsidiary  𝑖, 𝜋!! the taxable profit, and 𝑡!   the corporate tax 
rate in country 𝑖. 
	  
2.4.3 Optimal capital structure 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑝!!!,  !!! = (1− 𝐽!) 1− 𝑡! 𝐹 𝐾! , 𝐿! − 𝑤!×𝐿! − 𝐶!!(𝐽𝑖) − 𝐾! 𝑟(1− 𝑡! 𝑏!! +𝑏!! + 1− 𝑡! (𝐶! 𝑏!! + 𝐶! 𝑏!! ) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (2.8)	  
 16 
𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑟 ∗ 𝐾! ∗ 𝑏!! = 0! 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (2.9)	  
𝑠. 𝑡.        𝑏!! = !!!!!     ,      𝑎 = 𝐸, 𝐼 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (2.10)	  
The first order conditions to the maximization problem above lead to 
!!! !!!!!!! = !∗ !! !!!! !!!!!! !!!! ≥ 0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (2.11)	  
!!! !!!!!!! = !!∗!!!!! > 0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (2.12)	  
From the first order condition for internal debt we can see how minority ownership affects 
the leverage structure 
!!!!!!! = − !!∗!!!!! !!! !!!! ! !!!! < 0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (2.13)	  
	  
We conclude with this equation that minority ownership reduces the incentive to use internal 
debt as a tax minimizing strategy. 
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3. Tax systems and tax codes 
The taxation rules the MNC meet in its various jurisdictions is the key driver for its tax 
avoidance strategies. Companies might face taxes on income, input, output or assets, but we 
will in this thesis keep focus on the income tax. Income tax is levied on corporate profits, 
and may in certain countries include withholding tax on interest, dividends and royalties 
from securities owned by a non-resident. MNCs set up their tax avoidance strategies based 
on the different taxes they are facing, and these strategies are continuously changing, along 
with changes in international taxation rules and changes in the company´s operations.  
We will now take a look at some of the different international tax systems a MNC might be 
facing, give a brief summary of the tax codes in Norway, Sweden and the United States, 
before looking at specific rules for certain types of firms and closed jurisdictions such as tax 
havens and "shell corporations".  
 
 International tax systems 3.1
The two most common systems for taxing MNCs, by dividing its taxable income among its 
tax jurisdictions, are Separate Accounting (SA) and Formula Apportionment (FA)14.  
SA is the most commonly used method, where each subsidiary´s tax liability is calculated 
based on the laws of the jurisdiction, and all internal transactions are measured using the 
arms-length principle. The FA method allocates the total tax burden of the MNC among its 
affiliates based on the affiliates weighted portion of different variables, such as the MNCs 
total assets, sales or total wage expenses. We can use the following formula to better explain 
the FA method:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (3.1)	  
                                                
14 Schjeldrup, 2013 
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The latter is by many seen as a superior method because it divides the tax liabilities based on 
the actual activity in the affiliate. This means that it will be impossible for the MNC to evade 
taxes in any jurisdiction in which there is activity, minimizing or even eliminating the 
incentives for shifting profits to low tax countries through abusive transfer pricing. Still, the 
OECD makes use of the SA-system, giving the MNCs good incentives to continue shifting 
profits to low-tax countries.  
 
3.1.1 Double taxation problem  
When a company is engaged in operations in several jurisdictions, each jurisdiction as well 
as the company will have interests as to where each affiliate is to be taxed. In certain cases, 
in the lack of tax treaties and a common understanding of the fiscal situation of the 
multinational, a situation called double taxation might arise. OECD defines double taxation 
as "the imposition of comparable taxes in two or more states on the same taxpayer in respect 
of the same subject matter and for identical periods". The double taxation problem has a 
harmful effect on the international exchange of goods and services, and on the movement of 
capital, technology and persons, and it is a common understanding that this obstacle needs to 
be removed. In 1992, OECD released "The OECD Model Convention on Income and on 
Capital. The model has been updated several times in order to address new tax issues, and 
aims to clarify, standardize and confirm the fiscal situation of multinationals, with the intent 
of removing the problem of double taxation. The OECD Model is voluntary, and aims to 
create mutual agreement over tax related issues across jurisdictions.  
In order to eliminate double taxation, the model suggests the use of the exemption method 
and credit method. We will use the description of the corporate income tax system by 
Huizinga et.al. to explain these two systems.15 
We consider a MNC headquartered in country p with a foreign subsidiary in country i. 
Interest income is tax deductible, and dividends to the parent company are taxed in at least 
one country. The subsidiary´s profits are first taxed in country i at a rate of . The 
                                                
15 Huizinga et al. 2006 
ti
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subsidiary then pays its profits as a dividend to the parent company, which might release a 
withholding tax from the subsidiary country equal to . The corporate and withholding tax 
in the subsidiary country combined, will now equal:  
.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (3.2)	  
The parent country might tax the income generated abroad, depending on the tax regime in 
this country, which might lead to double taxation. If the parent company follows a territorial 
or source-based tax system, the tax paid in the subsidiary will be exempted from taxation. 
The parent can also operate a worldwide or residence-based tax system, giving the parent a 
foreign tax credit on the tax paid in country i. The OECD model gives the companies an 
option between an exemption or a foreign tax credit. The latter will however be limited in 
order to prevent the domestic tax liability on foreign source income from becoming negative.  
Another possibility is an indirect credit regime, where the parent will pay no additional tax if 
its tax rate  is equal to ti . If  < ti , the parent will have an unused foreign tax credit, 
while > ti  will mean that the parent will have to pay a tax rate in the parent country equal 
to the difference between  and ti . With an indirect tax system, the effective tax rate on 
income from country i will equal . 
 International tax codes 3.2
In order for us to get a better view of how the MNCs can exploit local taxation laws, we will 
look at how tax authorities in Norway, Sweden and in the United States treat foreign income, 
and if there exists any favourable tax treaties with tax havens. The list of tax havens we have 
used is based on the list made by Ethical Consumer,16 and on the Financial Secrecy Index, 
developed by The Tax Justice Network. 17 
                                                
16 Ethical Consumer; 2012 
17 Tax Justice Network; 2013 
wie
ti +wie − tiwie
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3.2.1 Norway, Sweden and USA 
The countries most relevant in this thesis are Norway, Sweden and USA. By looking at the 
laws in these three jurisdictions, the trend is that both domestic and foreign income is taxed 
by the tax authorities following the global income principle, while foreign citizens are taxed 
on income made in each jurisdiction, following the source principle. A noticeable difference 
is that the United States taxes foreign income when it is repatriated. This might give MNCs 
incentives to keep income abroad, away from US tax authorities. We will see more of this 
later on. All countries practice various forms of thin-cap rules, and Sweden stands out by 
inducing a withholding tax on dividends paid to foreign companies.18  
Norway has tax treaties with close to all listed tax havens, Sweden is lacking quite a few, 
while the United States barely has any tax treaties. With this in mind, we might expect that 
the use of tax havens will be a more central part of the tax minimization strategy for IKEA 
than for Coca-Cola in Norway. We might further expect that tax havens will be aggressively 
used by The Coca-Cola Company, due to the lack of tax treaties in the US.	  	  
 Subsidiaries and Branches 3.3
When operating abroad, an important consideration for the MNC will be the choice between 
setting up its operation as a branch or as a wholly owned foreign subsidiary, two structures 
with different advantages and disadvantages in a tax perspective. The differences between 
these two types of entities will be central in the analysis of the business structure of Coca 
Cola, and their reasoning for choosing as they have when setting up foreign affiliates.  
Mark Northeast, a senior tax consultant at KPMG Melbourne, defines a branch as: "a part, 
division, or section of an entity that is set apart to undertake certain responsibilities or 
tasks." 19 As the name suggests, a branch can be considered an extension of a company, 
whose main objective is to carry on business and generate revenue in a foreign country.  
                                                
18 Information is taken from Deloitte´s tax reviews, as well as from local tax laws presented by Finansdepartementet 
(Norway), Skatteverket (Sweden) and IRS (USA)  
19 Northeast, 1991 
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A subsidiary differs from a branch in the fact that it is a separate legal and corporate entity, 
where more than 50% of its share capital is owned by the parent company. A subsidiary has 
its own board of directors and can act by itself, and will also face taxes in its home country 
on its worldwide income. 20 As a shareholder, the parent company might face taxes on 
profits received from a subsidiary in the form of dividends, while this procedure will only be 
a mere internal rearrangement of funds in the use of a branch.  
A clear advantage of using a branch will be that any losses should be available for use in the 
jurisdiction of the parent company, thus decreasing profits and tax costs at the corporate 
level. If the foreign affiliate is located in a low tax country, and running a profit, a subsidiary 
will be beneficial being that the company will be able to take advantage of the low tax rate, 
whereas a branch´s profit will be taxed at a higher rate in the jurisdiction of the parent 
company.	  	  
 Tax havens & other secrecy jurisdictions 3.4
A tax haven can be described as a state with low or zero income tax. The expression is 
relative, being that the relative differences in tax rates and tax codes between countries are 
the variables deciding if a country is reckoned a tax haven or not. Thus, a country might be a 
tax haven in some relations, whilst not in other. 21 Tax Justice Network defines a tax haven 
as: "any country or territory that promotes laws with the intent that they may be used to 
avoid or evade taxes which may be due in another country under that other country´s 
laws".22 In the article "Harmful Tax Competition" from 1998,23 The OECD presents four key 
factors identifying tax havens: 
 1. No or only nominal taxes 
 2. Lack of effective exchange of information 
                                                
20 Invest Brussels; 2012 
21 Zimmer, 2009 
22 Murphy et al. 2012 
23 OECD, 1998 
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 3. Lack of transparency 
 4. No substantial activity 
In other words, a low or zero tax-rate is not the only attractive variable for a MNC looking to 
minimize its total tax burden. A high level of secrecy, causing an inefficient flow of 
information to the MNCs home country, will be beneficial for a tax-dodger in the sense that 
it will allow the company to hide relevant information from tax authorities. Such information 
might be regarding income, assets, cash flow, business structures and ownership structures, 
special agreements such as trusts, and other types of information, making it impossible for 
tax authorities to tax the company on its actual operations. Many countries will be able to 
offer such secrecy to "offshore corporations", or corporations located outside the country, 
making them what we call secrecy jurisdictions. All countries have a certain degree of 
secrecy in order to prevent the leakage of sensitive information, usually with regards to 
personal information in the health sector, for lawyers and other sectors where sensitive 
information is treated. What separates tax havens and secrecy jurisdictions from other 
countries is the level of secrecy in sectors such as in the financial sector, where information 
regarding MNCs will be hard or impossible for tax authorities to obtain without signed 
agreements and tax treaties. Many tax havens, such as The Cayman Islands and Belize, offer 
special secrecy agreements for offshore corporations or International Business Companies 
(IBCs), positioning themselves as attractive locations for MNCs trying to avoid taxes.  
As we can see from the factors presented by the OECD, tax havens are not only the tropical 
islands we immediately think of, with zero tax rates and small office buildings housing 
thousands of foreign companies, such as the Cayman Islands, Bahamas or Bermuda. A tax 
heaven might also be a country with a developed economy, a diversified industrial base, and 
a normal tax system, but with certain beneficial laws or exceptions for various activities or 
for certain types of companies.24 In addition to the four factors mentioned above, another key 
driver for a country operating as a tax haven is a diverse selection of beneficial tax treaties 
with other countries, allowing companies to use the country as a "shell-country", where they 
can set up pro-forma shell-corporations, with the sole function of channelling funds from 
one location to another, tax free.	  
                                                
24 Dijk et al. - The Netherlands: A Tax Haven? - SOMO-Report 2006 
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 Shell-states 3.5
Shell-states usually differ from other states in that they possess a high number of favourable 
tax treaties with other countries. The shell-states usually have favourable tax legislations 
with little or no withholding tax, and their tax treaties often reduce or remove withholding 
tax from income generated in other countries. This makes for a perfect money-laundering 
location, where the flow of income from a company´s foreign affiliates can run through and 
into other countries, untaxed. In chapter 4 we will describe some of the well-known 
strategies used by MNCs to exploit tax treaties, also referred to as treaty shopping. The 
Somo-Report argues that the Netherlands is one of the biggest shell-states in the world, 
while Luxembourg, Belgium, Ireland, The City of London, Hong Kong and Delaware, and 
several others, are also commonly referred to as locations used in such tax schemes. In The 
Tax Free Tour25, a documentary about the increasing avoidance of taxes, it is assumed that 
as much as €11 trillion is routed through shell-corporations in the Netherlands each year, 
only for fiscal reasons. These countries all have large financial sectors with experienced 
people advising multinationals in their strategic planning, and are ruled by a high degree of 
secrecy and low transparency.26 We will discuss more on the role of the different parties in 
chapter 4.6. 
 Private foundations 3.6
Certain countries have implemented strict rules and bylaws that a private foundation must 
follow. This is partly done to prevent individuals and companies from using foundations as 
their private bank accounts. In the United States the IRS has written the following rule27: 
“A private foundation that is not a private operating foundation must pay out, as qualifying 
distributions, its minimum investment return. This is generally 5% of the total fair market 
value of its non charitable assets, subject to further adjustments as explained” -Part X. 
Minimum Investment Return 
                                                
25 Meerman, 2013 
26 Tax Justice Network - Tax us if you can; 2012 
27 Treasury Internal Revenue Service, Instructions for Form 990-PF (2013) 
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The IRS also writes that the intent is to ensure that a tax-exempt organization does not serve 
a private interest, but a public one. If an individual or group benefit substantially, the 
organization risks its tax-exempt status.28 Such rules does not apply in Norway or Sweden, 
making private foundations attractive for fiscal reasons, something we will see when 
analysing IKEA.   
 Tax Evasion, Tax Avoidance and Tax Planning 3.7
Finnerty, Merks, Petriccione & Russo describe that from a tax authority´s point of view, one 
might use these terms interchangeably, thinking that a dollar or euro lost in revenue due to 
tax evasion is the same as a dollar or euro lost in revenue due to tax avoidance. There is 
however a significant difference, being that Tax Evasion is illegal, while Tax Avoidance and 
Tax Planning is perfectly legal.29 
3.7.1 Tax Evasion 
"Tax Evasion is considered an illegal practice where a person, organization or corporation 
intentionally avoids paying his/her/its true tax liability. Those caught evading taxes are 
generally subject to criminal charges and substantial penalties" 30 
What is defined as legal or illegal practice varies between countries. Differences in taxation 
laws may lead to something being legal in one country while illegal in another country 
(Finnerty et al., 2007). Because of these differences, we cannot identify an illegal transaction 
from an international point of view, which makes the "war" on tax evasion even more 
difficult.  
In 1987, the OECD gave the following definition of tax evasion in its report International 
Tax Avoidance and Evasion:  
                                                
28 IRS: compliance Guide for 501 ( c) (3) Private Foundations 
29 Finnerty et al., 2007 
30 Investopedia; Definition of Tax Haven 
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"The term "tax evasion" covers: an action by the taxpayer which entails breaking the law 
and which moreover can be shown to have been taken with the intention of escaping 
payment of tax." 
In other words, tax evasion can be generally defined as the direct violation of a tax 
provision31 
3.7.2 Tax Avoidance and Tax Planning 
Finnerty et al. (2007) points out that for most states, the difficulty is not so much to define 
tax evasion, but rather to distinguish tax evasion from tax avoidance and tax planning. They 
state the fact that taxpayers are free to arrange their affairs as they wish in order to save 
taxes.  
The dividing line between Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance & Tax Planning is not entirely 
clear. If a multinational corporation sets up a factory in a low-tax country instead of a high 
tax country, with the sole purpose of minimizing tax costs, the multinational is engaged in 
tax avoidance. If a Norwegian citizen sets up a secret bank account in a tax haven, and does 
not report the interest income to the government, he/she is engaged in tax evasion. The 
multinational is avoiding taxes in a perfectly legal way by performing tax planning, whereas 
the Norwegian citizen is evading taxes and might end up facing criminal charges for his/her 
actions. 
However, there are numerous activities, particularly performed by corporations that are 
referred to as avoidance but could just as likely be referred to as evasion. Among these 
activities is so called transfer pricing, where firms charge low prices for sales to low-tax 
affiliates, but pay high prices for purchases from them. If the arms-length principle (see 
chapter 5.1.2) is not followed, this may be regarded as evasion, but due to the difficulties of 
finding an accurate price, and being able to find evidence to prove that mispricing has taken 
place, such cases rarely go to, or hold up, in court.32  
	  
                                                
31 Finnerty et al., 2007 
32 Gravelle, 2013 
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4. Tax minimization strategies 
We have so far in this thesis explained the theories behind the corporate structure of both 
domestic firms and MNCs, and described how MNCs can use either subsidiaries or branches 
when doing business abroad. We have summarized the tax rules in various jurisdictions, and 
looked at the special cases of tax havens, other high secrecy jurisdictions, shell-countries and 
private foundations. In this chapter, we will use this theory to present some of the various tax 
minimization strategies available to MNCs. As we mentioned in chapter 3.7, there is a fine 
line between what is considered as tax planning or tax avoidance and what is considered 
illegal tax evasion. In the documentary "The Tax Free Tour", the difference between the two 
is described as the debt of a prison wall. Some of the strategies explained in this chapter are 
considered illegal, if they are used aggressively, and we have good reason to believe that 
these strategies are in fact being frequently used.  
 Transfer Pricing 4.1
4.1.1 Definition 
In today’s globalized world, transfer pricing has grown to be one of the most important parts 
of multinational enterprises tax-saving strategies. It includes terms and conditions regarding 
transactions between related parties, where the lack of the open market as a regulator, creates 
tax saving possibilities for the multinational enterprises, denying governments around the 
world huge amounts of tax income every year.  
Transfer pricing occurs whenever two related firms trade tangible or intangible assets with 
each other. Transfer pricing is not illegal per se, and it is assumed that more than 60% of 
international trade happens within, rather than between multinational corporations.33  
In general, transfer pricing was introduced as a way of allocating costs between different 
affiliates and departments. The continuing increase in the globalization of markets and 
businesses, has made transfer pricing an important tool in management control, including 
                                                
33 Tax Justice Netwok; August 2012 
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cost allocation and performance management. Without accurate transfer prices, the 
multinational would not be able to separate the well performing areas of the firms from the 
poor performing ones.34  
4.1.2 Arms Length Principle  
The arm´s-length principle states that: "the transactions between affiliated firms must be 
made purely on commercial basis, both firms trying to maximize their advantage, and neither 
firm accommodating or favouring the other in any way".35 In other words, the transfer price 
applied by an affiliate of a MNC, when dealing with a related affiliate, should not differ from 
the price used if the transaction was to take place on the open market between unrelated 
parties, thus using an arms length price means using the market price.  
4.1.3 Incentives 
For a multinational firm dealing with different tax rates in each of its affiliates, transfer 
pricing may be used as a tool to reduce its total tax payments and increase profits at the 
corporate level. We can imagine Coca Cola, producing its beverages in affiliate A and 
selling it in affiliate B. If the tax rate in affiliate A is higher than in affiliate B (tA > tB), Coca 
Cola will profit from shifting its profits away from the high-taxed affiliate (A) and into the 
low-taxed affiliate (B). By under-invoicing affiliate B using a low transfer price (LTP), 
profits in affiliate A will decrease and profits in affiliate B will increase, hence Coca Cola 
will reduce its total tax payments on corporate level. If, in contrast, the tax rate in affiliate A 
is lower than in affiliate B (tA < tB), Coca Cola will try to shift profits from the high-taxed 
affiliate (B) and into the low-taxed affiliate (A). Affiliate A will in this scenario over-invoice 
the beverages sold to affiliate B using a high transfer price (HTP), increasing profits in 
affiliate A while decreasing profits in affiliate B.  
In the scenario described above, the government will have an easy job deciding the fair value 
of the traded goods, being that the goods are beverages sold all over the world on the free 
market. The tax saving possibilities for the MNCs occur when the traded assets are difficult 
to value, such as intangible assets, intellectual property, services, or other assets that are not 
                                                
34 Sandslått; 2008 
35 Business Dictionary 2013	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being traded on the free market. In the case of Coca Cola, such an intangible asset might be 
the syrup used in the making of the Coca Cola beverage, and the price the bottlers have to 
pay in order to use this syrup. It might also be different types of technology, patents, services 
or even knowledge. 
4.1.4 Model 
We will now take a look at how MNCs set their transfer prices, with the intent of saving as 
much as possible in tax payments. We will show how regulations from the government and 
tax authorities affects the MNCs use of transfer pricing, how minority ownership has an 
effect on the firms decisions, and also describe the arms length principle and the challenges 
the authorities face when dealing with suspicion of mispricing. In this section of the thesis, 
we will make use of the model developed by professor Guttorm Schjelderup with the 
Norwegian School of Economics and the Norwegian Center for Taxation (NoCeT). The 
model is described in the article "Multinationals and Transfer Pricing", and gives a perfectly 
good insight to the theories behind how the MNEs set their transfer prices.36 
The model describes a MNC with affiliates 1 and 2, located in country 1 and country 2. We 
assume that each of these two affiliates has monopolistic positions in their own market, and 
that the MNCs objective is to maximize its net global profits. We further assume that the 
MNC is able to practice systematic price discrimination between the two affiliates and their 
respective countries. 
Firm 1 produces quantities Q1 and Q2 of product 1 and 2. Quantity Q1 is sold in country 1 at 
a price of P1(Q1), giving revenues equal to R1(Q1) = P1(Q1)Q1.  
Firm 2 imports Q2 at a transfer price of p, and sells the product in Country 2 for P2(Q2), 
earning Firm 2 revenues equal to R2(Q2) = P2(Q2)Q2. 
We assume a convex cost function where  and , and a concave profit 
function where and . 
                                                
36 Schjeldrup, 2011 
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The profit functions for the two affiliates can now be written as: 
π1	  =	  R1	  (Q1)	  −	  C	  (Q1	  +	  Q2)	  +	  pQ2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
π2	  =	  R2	  (Q2)	  −	  pQ2	  	  
In a situation without income taxes, the internal price of product Q2 will not affect global 
profits, since the costs for Firm 2 will equal the income for Firm 1 when the product is sold 
internally. Thus, the MNC will not have any incentives to manipulate the internal price in 
order to shift profits. In this example, both firms are facing taxes in the country where they 
are located, giving tax rates of t1 in Country 1 and t2 in Country 2. We further assume that t1 
< t2. The profits from the affiliates are repatriated to the parent company. As written earlier 
in this thesis (Tax Code section), the taxation of repatriated profits varies across countries. In 
Norway and Mexico, dividends are not subject to tax if they are sent to a corporate 
shareholder, being that they have already been taxed, cf. the global income principle. 
Dividends might be subject to tax when paid out to personal shareholders located in different 
countries with different taxation rules. For this reason, Schjelderup decides to investigate 
how the firm behaves by not taking into consideration personal dividend taxation in various 
countries, and rather look at how the firm maximizes profits after tax on a global level. The 
after tax profit for the MNC can now be written as follows:  
π = (1− t1)π1 + (1− t2 )π 2 	  
π = (1− t1) R1(Q1)−C(Q1 +Q2 )+ pQ2[ ]+ (1− t2 ) R2 (Q2 )− pQ2[ ] 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (4.1)	  
By derivating the after tax profit function with respect to the internal price p, we are able to 
find the first order condition (FOC) 
∂π
∂p = (1− t1) Q2[ ]+ (1− t2 ) −Q2[ ]
∂π
∂p = (t2 − t1)Q2 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (4.2)
	  
If we consider a situation where the tax rates in the two countries are equal       (t1 = t2), FOC 
will equal zero, , and the optimal transfer price, p*, will equal zero. There will be no ∂π
∂p = 0
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incentives for the MNC to manipulate its transfer price. In this model we assume t1 < t2, 
indicating that FOC > 0. In this situation, it will be optimal for the company to shift profit 
from the high tax country (country 2) to the low tax country (country 1), through the use of a 
high internal price. In order to minimize taxation for the company as a whole, it will be 
optimal to shift all profits to country 1, in other words by setting .	  	  
The	   company	   needs	   to	   decide	   Q1,	   Q2	   and	   p	   in	   order	   to	   maximize	   global	   profits.	   The	  
maximization	   problem	   can	   be	   perceived	   as	   a	   two-­‐stage	  maximization	   procedure,	   finding	  
the	   optimal	   transfer	   price	   p*,	   and	   finding	   the	   optimal	   quatities	   of	  Q1	   and	  Q2	  when	  p*	   is	  
accounted	  for.	  The	  MNC	  wish	  to	  maximize	  global	  profits	  by	  minimizing	  profits	  in	  country	  2.	  
The	  optimal	  internal	  price	  will	  therefore	  give:	  
	  
Figure	  4.1	  
Most countries, amongst these Norway and the United States, do not allow losses in foreign 
controlled subsidiaries to be deducted against taxable income in the country of residence.37 
,38 A too high transfer price, causing a loss in country 2, will therefore not be deducted in 
country 1, and will only increase the total tax payments for the MNC, as shown in figure 
(4.78). With this in mind, the optimal transfer price will be equal to: 
p*= R2 (Q2 )Q2
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (4.3)	  
                                                
37 Regjeringen, 2006 
38 IRS, 2005 
π 2 = 0
π 2 = (1− t2 ) R2 (Q2 )− pQ2[ ] = 0
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The next step in finding the optimal transfer price will be to insert the function for p* into 
the profit function (4.1), and to maximize this. To maximize, we putπ 2 = 0 , which cancels 
out the second part of the profit function: 
π = (1− t1) R1(Q1)−C(Q1 +Q2 )+ pQ2[ ]+ (1− t2 ) R2 (Q2 )− pQ2[ ] 	  
π = (1− t1) R1(Q1)−C(Q1 +Q2 )+ pQ2[ ]+ 0 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (4.4)	  
We then insert the optimal internal price: p*= R2 (Q2 )Q2
, giving us the following profit 
function: 
π = (1− t1) R1(Q1)−C(Q1 +Q2 )+
R2 (Q2 )
Q2
Q2
"
#
$
%
&
' 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (4.5)	  
We then derivate the profit function with respect to Q1 and Q2, which gives us: 
∂π
∂Q1
= (1− t1)
∂R
∂Q1
−
∂C
∂Q1
#
$
%
&
'
(= 0 	  
∂π
∂Q1
= (1− t1) MR−MC[ ] = 0 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (4,6)	  
And	  
∂π
∂Q2
= (1− t2 ) MR−MC[ ] = 0 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (4,7)	  
As we can see from our equations, the MNC sets its transfer price so that its marginal 
revenue equals its marginal cost, MRi = MCi, a common maximization strategy for a 
monopolist. Due to the lack of restrictions on transfer prices by local authorities, the MNC is 
able to operate as a monopolist, and shift all profits from the high tax country to the low tax 
country, minimizing its taxable income and its taxation.  
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4.1.5 Restricted Transfer Pricing 
In certain cases, the MNC will face regulations on its internal pricing. In the example 
discussed above, the government in country 1 has the incentives of subjecting the transfer 
price, being that profits are shifted to country 2, reducing tax income for the government in 
country 1. In either way, when profit shifting occurs, there will always be incentives for 
either of the governments to question the transfer prices. In this example, Q2 is produced in 
country 1, exported to country 2 and sold there. It will therefore be natural to assume that the 
market price of the product is public information, thus the government will be able to use 
this as a benchmark for setting the restricted transfer price. We can assume that the lowest 
possible price for the MNC, in a situation like this, will be to set its transfer price equal to its 
marginal costs, while the highest possible internal price will be the market price of the 
product.  
4.1.6 Transfer-Pricing In Less Than Wholly Owned Foreign 
Subsidiaries  
If the subsidiary located in country 2 is less than wholly owned, the MNC has to decide on 
an optimal transfer price, considering that a fraction of the profit in country 2 will have to be 
shared with the minority shareholders. For simplicity reasons, we do not add factors such as 
taxes or tariffs in this part of the thesis. If k equals the MNCs ownership in company 2, and 
we have that 0,5< k <1 , the profit function for the MNC will be: 
π = π1 + kπ 2 	  
π = R1(Q1)−C(Q1 +Q2 )+ pQ2[ ]+ k R2 (Q2 )− pQ2[ ] 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(4.8)	  
The MNC face the same two-way problem as described in the example of unrestricted 
transfer pricing, where they have to decide on an optimal transfer price p*, Q1 and Q2 in 
order to maximize π. The FOC for the profit function derived with respect to p, gives us the 
following equation: 
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  (4.9)	  
∂π
∂p =Q2 1− k( ) > 0
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With minority ownership, k < 1, and the company will have incentives of charging a high 
transfer price in order to shift profits from country 2 to country 1. In order to maximize 
profits, the MNC will set a transfer price so that π2 = 0, giving us the following global profit 
function: 
	  
Minority ownership creates the same incentives as high tax rates, encouraging the MNC to 
shift profits away from the less than wholly owned foreign affiliate in order to avoid sharing 
profits. The MNC sets its transfer price equal to the way a monopolist would set its transfer 
price. Such profit shifting strategies should in the long run keep investors from holding 
shares in the foreign affiliate, being that the rewards for holding these shares should be just 
as high as the reward for alternative investments. With this in mind, we can ask ourselves 
why investors still decide to hold shares in foreign subsidiaries of MNCs? Viable reasons 
might be the trust in local tax authorities to prevent profit shifting from happening, in 
addition to the disciplinary reputational effect on stake for the MNCs.  
4.1.7 Royalties 
A royalty is defined as a compensation for the right to use an intangible asset, such as a 
patent, trademark, know-how, technology, etc. 39 The OECD Model Tax Convention 
explains that it is not a requirement that the compensated right is registered, still a royalty 
has to be regarded as a payment for the use or for the right to use a certain asset. 40 It is also 
stated in the OECD Model Art. 12-4 that the price of the royalties, agreed upon by the two 
related parties, shall follow the arms-length principle. The problem with royalties is the 
question of how to determine a fair price, or an arms-length price, on such an intangible asset 
as a trademark or a patent. Tax authorities will in most cases have a hard time arguing the 
arms-length price on such trades, giving the MNCs the possibility of shifting profits to low 
tax jurisdictions through the use of high royalty payments. The general principle behind the 
use of royalties is to compensate the party behind the research and development of the assets. 
A common tax avoidance strategy is to transfer the rights to the intangible asset to an 
                                                
39 Zimmer, 2009 
40 OECD Model Tax Convention; Art. 12-8 
π = R1 Q1( )−C Q1 +Q2( )+ R2 Q2( )"# $%
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affiliate located in a low-tax jurisdiction or a tax haven, and maximize royalty payments 
from the "lenders" of the asset, located in high-tax jurisdictions. With this strategy, the 
MNCs will be able to transfer profits from high- to low-tax jurisdictions, and reduce their 
total tax payments on the corporate level. 	  
 Thin Capitalization  4.2
A company is thinly capitalized when it has a high degree of debt compared to equity. Tax 
jurisdictions often allow deductions of interest paid, leaving us reason to believe that there 
are incentives to “gear up”41 the firm. More debt most likely leads to higher interest 
payments, which again results in a greater value of the overall tax deduction of the firm42. 
There are several factors that drive the decision whether or not to conduct a thin 
capitalization. In addition to bankruptcy- and agency-costs, other factors might be interest 
rates, corporate tax rates or the availability and trade off to the cost of equity in the various 
jurisdictions. By looking at the formula below that states the optimal capital structure one 
can also see that MNCs have a higher upside relatively to domestic firms and therefore also 
hold more incentives to increase debt. We stated in chapter 2 that there are two types of 
debts, external and internal. MNC’s advantage is that they can exploit different corporate tax 
rates by using internal debt43 as they are per definition located in more than one country (see 
highlighted factors in formula). 
	  𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑝!!!,  𝑫𝒊𝑰 = 1− 𝑡! ∙ 𝐹 𝐾! , 𝐿! − 𝑤! ∙ 𝐿! − 𝑟 ∙ 𝐾! + 𝑡! ∙ 𝑟 ∙ 𝐷!! + 1 ∙𝑫𝒊𝑰 −1− 𝑡! 𝐶! 𝑏!! + 𝑪𝑰 𝒃𝒊𝑰 ∙ 𝐾! − 𝐶! 𝑏! − 𝜆 𝑟 ∙𝑫𝒊𝑰! 	  	  
	  
Formula explained: Production factors are real capital - 𝐾! and labor - 𝐿!. The production 
function: 𝑥! = 𝐹 𝐾! , 𝐿!  (with decreasing marginal productivities in each factor). External 
debt cost function (agency costs) is given by 𝐶! 𝑏!!  and internal debt cost function 
(concealment costs) 𝐶! 𝑏!! . The wage rate is set by 𝑤! and the rental cost of capital per unit, 
                                                
41 Gearing refers to a company with a high D/A ratio 
42 Not considering the PV(Bankruptcy costs) nor PV(Agency costs)  
43 Møen et al. 2011 
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𝑟. 𝐷!! is the size of the internal debt whereas 𝐷!! the size of the external debt. 𝑡! is the 
corporate tax rate.  
To simplify the thin capitalization let us assume that the MNC’s profit is only based on 
internal debt. Country A has a corporate tax rate of 33%, whereas country B is a tax haven 
and therefore has a corporate tax rate equal to 1%. The affiliate in country B lends $100 to 
the affiliate in country A for a set interest equal to 15% over a 1-year period.  
	  
	  
Figure	  4.2	  
	  
In addition creating a lower net income/decreased tax obligations for company A the group 
will also enjoy an arbitrage that generates an undiscounted $4.85 for every $100 dollar B 
lends to A44. MNCs will therefore, without any form for thin capitalization rules, be more 
likely to have a higher D/A-ratio in high tax jurisdictions and locate the company’s internal 
bank in a low tax jurisdiction or in a tax haven.  
When shifting international debt, the affiliate in the high tax jurisdiction claims tax 
deduction on the interest expenses. “There is evidence that multinationals excessively load 
those affiliates generating high net tax savings with external debt…to keep overall 
bankruptcy costs in check, the use of external debt in affiliates with low tax savings is 
reduced”45. In the eyes of the pecking theory we can say that if retained earnings is equal to 
zero, there exist no regulations on the internal debt shifting, and there is a positive taxable 
income, MNCs will choose internal debt as equity subsidy given perfect markets.  
                                                
44 We assume that both jurisdictions allows for tax deduction and tax interest rate equal to the corporate interest rate 
45 Ruf and Schindler, 2012 
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4.2.1 Thin cap rules 
One challenge, as the example in the previous chapter illustrates, is that a MNC only needs 
one affiliate located in a country that is defined as a tax haven, or has a low corporate tax 
rate, to exploit the described example above. One might say that this is a jurisdictional 
prisoner’s dilemma as more people would have been better off if we assume that it in terms 
will lead to higher governmental tax income and increased welfare if tax havens were non-
existent. There are however, incentives for countries to operate as tax havens in terms of for 
example increased capital activity, by attracting more firms to the country, job creations and 
increased overall wage levels. 
Governments have implemented thin capitalization rules as a countermeasure to this 
arbitrage possibility (TC-rules). Canada was the first country to introduce TC-rules (1971), 
Australia (1987) and the US (1989). Between the mid-nineties and 2005 a share of OECD-
countries also had established TC-rules46. The OECD supports thin capitalization rules and 
states that member countries are free to implement such rules, as long as the result leads to a 
determination of taxable basis that satisfies the arm’s length principle47. Büttner 2012 goes 
on and finds empirical analysis that shows thin-capitalization rules exert substantial effects 
on the tax-sensitivity of the capital structure. Büttner 2012 estimated that tax-sensitivity of 
internal debt is reduced by about a half if a country imposes a relatively strict thin-
capitalization rule.  
Thin capitalization rules are created to narrow the excessive debt financing and tax-revenue 
losses from international debt shifting.48 There are in principle two approaches: Specific and 
non-specific thin capitalization rules.49 Specific thin-capitalization rules restrict the interest 
deductibility for loans provided to a domestic corporation by a foreign parent or by other 
foreign affiliates of the controlling shareholder50 whereas nonspecific thin capitalization 
                                                
46 Buettner et al. 2012 
47 More on the arm’s length principle later on in Chapter 4.1.2  
48 Ruf and Schindler, 2012 
49 Dourado and Feria, 2008 
50 Buettner et al. 2012  
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rules restrict the use of debt in general.51 The mutual aim between the specific and the 
nonspecific is to curb excessive debt financing and tax-revenue losses from international 
debt shifting.52 We will take a further look at the different restrictions, such as the arm’s 
length principle, controlled foreign company rules, earnings-stripping rules, bed and 
breakfasting, safe harbours and internal debt to asset ratio rules later on.  
Møen, Schindler, Schjeldrup and Tropina (2011)53 finds that an MNC’s affiliate is more 
likely to possess a higher degree of external debt relatively to other affiliates with the same 
parent company if the affiliate is located in a high tax jurisdiction. If that particular 
jurisdiction lowers the tax levels, the bankruptcy costs for the group will increase hence 
making it less attractive carrying external debt for the respective affiliate. As part of the 
overall taxation strategy, the group will therefore allocate external debt with respect to the 
jurisdiction tax rate levels to minimize bankruptcy costs. 
We can therefore say it is more attractive shifting both external and internal debt for 
multinationals compared to domestic firms, due to the fact that multinationals can exploit 
differences in tax rates. 
4.2.2 Debt tax shield effects 
Møen, Schindler, Schjeldrup and Tropina (2011) shows that there are three debt tax shield 
effects that MNCs can use. They define the drivers behind the total debt to asset ratio, b!, of 
an affiliate with the formula below54. 
𝑏! = 𝛽! + 𝛽! ∙ 𝑡! + 𝛽! ∙ 𝑝! 𝑡! − 𝑡! + 𝛽! ∙ 𝑡! − 𝑡!!!! ,∀  𝑖 > 1 
The following paragraphs will explain each driver and the three mechanism of this formula. 
	  
                                                
51 Ruf and Schindler, 2012 
52 Ruf and Schindler, 2012 
53 Møen et al. 2011 
54 Møen et al. 2011 
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The	  standard	  debt	  tax	  shield	  
Figure	  4.3	  
In chapter 2 we elaborate the effects of the standard debt tax shield. We can see that the size 
of the tax shield is affected by the corporate tax rate in affiliate i and will increase along with 
the tax shield until the FOC = 0 when  𝑏!! > 0.	  
External	  debt	  shifting	  mechanism	  
Figure	  4.4	  
As mentioned in chapter 4.2.1 we explained that MNCs will allocate external debt in those 
affiliates that produce the highest absolute tax savings hence those with the highest effective 
corporate tax rate55 relatively to the affiliate with the lowest effective corporate tax rate 
maximizing the difference illustrated in figure 4.2. Other effects of leverage are the 
decreased level of free cash flow56 forcing managers to run the firm as efficiently increasing 
its productivity.57  
  
                                                
55 Formula standard debt shield proves that corporate tax rates affect tax savings 
56 As the debt-to-asset ratio increases we assume that interest payments increases as well implying that the access to free 
cash flow decreases  
57Berk, J. & DeMarzo (2011) 
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Internal debt shifting mechanism 
Figure	  4.5	  
The internal debt shifting mechanism affects the total debt-to-asset ratio through internal 
debt. MNCs can exploit this by maximizing the gap between the affiliates and the company’s 
internal bank (i.e. locate the internal bank with the jurisdiction with the lowest tax rate). By 
doing so, company i deduct a higher level of interest payments than company/internal bank 1 
has in taxable payments provided that  𝑡! ≠ 𝑡!. The MNC will therefore have incentives to 
increase the debt-to-asset ratios in the high tax affiliates.58 
 Other tax minimization strategies 4.3
We will here explain two tax minimization strategies that are frequently used by large 
MNCs. We will first explain the scheme based on various articles, and then draw a figure 
that is solely based on its explanation. 
4.3.1 Double Irish arrangement 
The U.S. parent company establishes an S1, Irish affiliate and enters into a legal agreement 
which gives S1 rights to sell its intangible assets and do marketing on the parent company’s 
behalf with financial back up provided by the parent company59. The headquarters and 
management of the Irish S1 is located in a Tax Haven. Since most national legislations states 
that a company is subject to the corporate tax rulings where its management resides, the 
company will be subject to a corporate tax rate of 0%. The reason why S1 is incorporated in 
Ireland and not only in the Tax Haven is due to EU dividend policies which make it possible 
for EU companies to freely transfer money within the EU60.  
                                                
58 Møen et al. 2011  
59Schjelderup, 2013	  
60 Darby, 2007 
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The S1 then lends the rights to its subsidiary, S2, which now bears the rights to sell and 
further distribute the right to international affiliates. Since the operating affiliates are lending 
the group’s brand or intangible assets directly from S2, they are subject to pay for this in the 
form of royalties to S261. These payments to S2 are tax-deductible, meaning they will end up 
being subject to marginal tax obligations. S2 is also subject to pay S1 for the rights and will 
funnel the royalties received from the operating affiliates, tax free, to S1. 
A double Irish arrangement is illustrated in figure 4.662 
	  
Figure	  4.6	  
Summing up:  
• The operating affiliate reduces its profit paying royalties (tax deductible) to S2. 
• The Irish S2 receives the royalties from the operating affiliate which is not subject to 
tax obligations. The royalties are funnelled to the dual resident firm, S1, once again, 
tax free. 
• S1’s income and fortune is subject to the tax haven’s tax policies which often is a 
synonym of 0.  
                                                
61 Lowder, 2011 
62 Based on this thesis’s chapter 5.3 
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• U.S. parent and S1 have an “Advanced Pricing Agreement” (APA) which makes it 
possible for US firms to operate like this (APA approved by U.S. tax authorities in 
2006).   
 
4.3.2 The Dutch Sandwich 
This scheme exploits the agreement between Ireland and other EU countries to further 
reduce their tax burdens. This structure resembles the double Irish as we saw in the previous 
paragraph. However, the ploy converts the double Irish into a Dutch Sandwich. The system 
is granting the rights from the tax haven and has the Netherlands (S3) affiliate funnelling the 
money between S1 and S2, which further reduces the group’s tax burdens. 63 The Irish tax 
system does not demand tax from money being moved around in Europe, implying that the 
funnelled money is tax-free. Incentives for this occur when the costs of tax obligations in 
Ireland exceed the fee of what the company located in the Netherlands requires for 
funnelling the money.  
                                                
63 Darby, 2007 
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Figure	  4.764	  
	  
4.3.3 The Delaware Loophole 
Delaware is currently one of the most attractive tax havens in the world, and is in fact 
housing nearly half of all public corporations in the United States.65 What makes this 
location so attractive is the easiness of establishing shell corporations (see 4.3.6) and the 
high degree of secrecy it allows. The companies can use these shell corporations to shift 
profits from other locations, in the form of royalty-payments or other revenues, to Delaware 
where it is not taxed. Estimations reckon that The Delaware Loophole has reduced taxes paid 
to other states by a massive USD $9,5 billion over the last decade. The Coca-Cola Company 
is one of the many companies located in Delaware, and there is reason to believe that this is 
for fiscal reasons.  
                                                
64 Lowder, 2011   
65 Wayne, 2012 
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4.3.4 How to get the money back home 
If an American profitable company has chosen a scheme like previously described (The 
double Irish and the Dutch sandwich) it will find itself with assets located in a tax haven. If it 
chooses to transfer the money back home, crossing the U.S. border, the IRS would classify it 
as income tax.66 Strategies used by U.S. companies in order to avoid these obligations 
follow: 
“U.S.	  companies	  overall	  use	  various	  repatriation	  strategies	  to	  avoid	  about	  
$25	  billion	  a	  year	  in	  federal	  income	  taxes.”-­‐	  Edward	  D.	  Kleinbard	  (Professor	  in	  
law	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Southern	  California)67	  
The	  Killer	  B	  
One of the strategies frequently used in order to get the cash back to the U.S. is called the 
Killer B. This manoeuvre stems from the Internal Revenue Code section 368(a)(1)(B) which 
deals with tax-free reorganizations68. A U.S. company is able to sell shares to its offshore 
subsidiary. By doing this it will bring the cash back to the U.S, completely cash free. The 
foreign subsidiary can use the stock to make further acquisitions, which may on the bottom 
line benefit the parent. It is necessary to mention that the IRS has been increasingly thwarted 
this tactic since 200669. 
	  
	  
	   	  
                                                
66 Lowder, 2011 
67 Quote given in Drucker 2010. 
68 Drucker, 2010 
69 Lowder, 2011  
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The	  Deadly	  D	  
The name of this manoeuvre stems from a section of U.S. tax laws. A U.S. company can 
receive money tax-free from its subsidiary by acquiring a company in which the ownerships 
get transferred to the subsidiary. By doing so, the U.S. parent can pull cash from its 
subsidiary limited to the purchasing price of the acquired company 
The	  Outbound	  F	  
If a U.S. firm chooses to run this strategy it will first acquire another U.S. company with a 
large future cash transfer stated as a clausal. The acquired firm will then be registered as a 
subsidiary in another country, borrow money from the previously existing sister subsidiary, 
and use this money to upheld the clausal. Although it is a company located “offshore”, the 
foreign cash is not treated as dividend, but as a non-taxable payment due to the status 
between the parent and of the acquired company during the payment commitment.  
 
4.3.5 Trust Company 
The purpose behind a trust company can be an eventual transfer of assets to a beneficial 
party, management and administration on behalf of a person or a business entity. It doesn’t 
own the company asset, but may possess legal obligation to control assets on behalf of other 
parties. See double Irish figure for an illustration. 
 
4.3.6 Shell Corporations 
A shell company is characterized as an entity with no active or operational businesses.70 
These entities have typically none or only a handful of employee. It may be formed ahead of 
commencing operations in order to obtain financing. Shell companies are making 
investigation troublesome for governments, individuals, courtrooms, master students and 
other outsiders as it often does not leave paper trail, has no phone number, e-mail or physical 
                                                
70 Garner,1999 
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addresses as well as no company logo or contact person. Shell corporations aren’t illegal or 
illegitimate, but can act as a tax minimization tool for legitimate businesses. 
 Indicators  4.4
It might be difficult for governments to audit MNCs thoroughly as some trust companies and 
shell corporations might legally withhold information71. In the following chapter we will 
look at indicators that are typical for subsidiaries or affiliates that large MNCs use for tax 
minimization. It is, however, important to emphasize that the following in this chapter are 
only observations from openly public information and does not necessary mean that the 
company uses tax avoidance strategies. 
 
4.4.1 Ratios 
As mentioned, shifting profits to low-tax jurisdiction to avoid tax obligations is a strategy. 
We have discussed several strategies that MNCs are using in order to minimize its 
worldwide tax burden such as transfer pricing and thin capitalization. The common feature is 
that it decreases the profit margin. In other words, tax obligations.  
If we were to explore ratios to find certain deviations in the financial statements to different 
affiliates of a MNC, we believe to find differences both in the overall net income to gross 
profit-ratio as well as the net income to EBIT-ratio. Below is a brief financial statement 
layout that explains the different posts a MNC can increase with respect to which tax 
avoidance strategy it follows. 
Revenue	   Income	  from	  goods	  and/or	  services	  sold	  
Cost	  of	  goods	  sold	   If	  a	  company	  uses	  transfer	  pricing	  as	  a	  tax	  avoidance	  
strategy	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  this	  post	  is	  higher	  in	  high-­‐tax	  
jurisdictions	  to	  obtain	  a	  lower	  gross	  profit	  
Interest	  income	   This	  post	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  relatively	  high	  if	  a	  company	  is	  
located	  in	  a	  low-­‐tax	  jurisdiction	  indicating	  thin	  
capitalisation	  and	  internal	  debt	  shifting	  in	  high-­‐tax	  
affiliates.	  
                                                
71 Company bylaws might state that it is not allowed to provide foreign governments with company information	  
 46 
Interest	  expense	   Visa	  versa:	  High	  tax	  affiliates	  can	  lower	  its	  EBT	  if	  this	  post	  is	  
high	  due	  to	  for	  example	  if	  the	  MNC	  is	  using	  thin	  
capitalisation	  and	  interest	  payment	  to	  lower	  its	  pre-­‐tax	  
earnings.	  
Earnings	  before	  tax	  (EBT)	   Regardless	  the	  strategy,	  this	  post	  has	  been	  proven	  to	  be	  
high	  in	  low-­‐tax	  jurisdictions	  (effective	  tax	  rate)	  and	  low	  in	  
high-­‐tax	  jurisdictions	  (effective	  tax	  rate)	  as	  the	  tax	  rate	  is	  
multiplied	  with	  this	  post	  and	  deducted	  from	  the	  company’s	  
net	  income.	  72	  
Figure	  4.8	  
Grubert (2012) finds that companies with lower effective foreign tax rates have both higher 
foreign profit margins and lower domestic profit margins. This proves that MNCs are, 
intentionally (or subconsciously), shifting profits away from high-tax jurisdictions. Later we 
will compare Coca Cola and Ikea’s profit margins with respect to the corporate tax rate. 
4.4.2 Transparency 
It is very typical for companies that commit to tax avoidance strategies to choose an 
ownership- and capital-structure that makes it difficult for outsiders to fully get the overall 
picture of the MNC. Although choosing a structure with limited transparency may be an 
indicator of tax engineering, there are other incentives as well. It might also be individuals or 
groups that wish to be anonymous. Either way, a structure of trust companies, shell-
corporations, royalties, shell-countries, tax havens etc. within the same MNC does have a 
sceptic tone to it. However, we can’t say if it is for tax purposes or not. 
 Moral hazard 4.5
During a hearing in the British Parliament in London in November 2012, representatives 
from Google, Amazon and Starbucks were asked about their low tax payments in the United 
Kingdom. The three representatives agreed that they have obligations; not only towards their 
shareholders, but also to the society, and that these obligations include paying their fair share 
of taxes. During 14 years of trading in the United Kingdom, Starbucks has paid a total of 
£1,6 million in corporation tax, even though their sales, their income statements, and the fact 
that they continue to operate in the area, suggest that their profits, and accordingly their total 
                                                
72 Grubert, 2012  
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tax payments, should be much higher.73 As a member of society, a society from which the 
companies derive huge benefits, one should expect the companies to participate in the same 
way as the normal workingman or -women, and pay their taxes. The moral hazard of the 
whole tax planning game is obvious. However, if you were given the chance to do an hour of 
work in order to pay half the tax you normally pay, would you not have taken it, done the 
work and increased your wealth? The fact is that the possibilities are there because of 
inefficient and non-cooperative global tax systems, and that companies, most of them with 
the sole purpose of making as much money as possible, will take advantage of them as much 
as they can. So who is responsible for these tax holes?  
 The actors 4.6
The accountants and auditors play a vital role in the tax avoidance game, in the fact that the 
big accounting firms, often referred to as the big four (EY, PWC, Deloitte &PWC), offer 
strategic planning advices to the MNCs. They use their expertise to help the firm achieve 
what they refer to as "neutral taxation" or "tax optimization", which in common English 
means zero tax. They can offer a huge, global network, and when the OECD identified states 
with unacceptable tax regulations (tax havens) in 1998, KPMG were present in 30 of 35. 
KPMG is managed from an office in the shell-country Switzerland, while PWCs operations 
are hidden in a London-based office with a claimed income of zero.74 
Because of the expertise of these people, they often end up playing a double role in the tax 
dodging game, where they offer services to MNCs while at the same time advising the tax 
authorities on how to "improve" the tax system. "The Tax Free Tour" actually points out that 
the new chairman of the tax authorities in the United Kingdom is a former senior partner in 
KPMG, and that the same is the case for Australia. This indicates that the large companies, 
employing the people with the highest expertise on tax matters, are actually working on the 
laws saying how they should be regulated, meaning that at the end of the day, the big firms 
are not accountable to anybody but themselves.  
                                                
73 Meerman, 2013 
74 Skjult; Tax Justice Network & Changemaker - used throughout this section 
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The MNCs are using lawyers when making large transactions, and when signing agreements 
within the firm or with governments regarding tax related issues. The lawyers are obliged to 
report any suspicious activity and any sign of money laundering, but Økokrim in Norway 
have criticized the low number of reports, indicating that illegalities are not being reported 
and that the lawyers are playing a role in these scams. 
In order for the MNCs to be able to operate in tax havens, they need to have banks in these 
havens to deal with the money transfers. The banks often locate themselves in tax havens 
close to where they carry out their main operation, and we find that many South American 
banks locate themselves in the Cayman Islands, whereas Bermuda and Bahamas are 
attractive locations for banks from the United States. It is estimated that $21,000 bn. is 
located in tax havens, and that the world’s 50 largest banks hold $12,100 billion of these.75 
The accountants, lawyers and bankers are nicknamed "the pin-stripe mafia" by Richard 
Murphy in "The Tax Free Tour", and he explains that there is a large degree of fear ruling 
the environment, and that this is the reason why so much illegal activity is left unreported. A 
whistle-blower will face the risk of losing his/her job, of destroying her profession and of 
being sued.  
In addition to "the pin-stripe mafia", the MNCs, various other organizations and the 
governments, both in tax havens and in other states, are responsible for the tax holes. The 
MNCs and various organizations with big investments are the ones creating the need for 
such tax avoidance strategies, while the governments are the ones responsible for the rules in 
their jurisdiction. The tax havens are preventing sustainable development and a fair 
allocation of resources on a global basis, and the different governments are the ones best 
suited to put a stop to this.  
In Kenya, and in many other African countries, companies are given a 10-year tax break 
when commencing trade. What happens after 10 years is that the company either leaves, or 
restructures its ownership, which initiates a new 10-year tax break. This is an example of 
harmful tax-codes, which are easily exploited and should be revised. We will talk more 
about possible solutions and taxation for the future in Chapter 10.	   	  
                                                
75 Henry; 2012 
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5. Analysis of relevant litterature 
In the previous chapter we explained the different tax minimization strategies available to 
MNCs. A natural step in this thesis will now be to try and find out if the MNCs actually use 
these strategies. In this chapter we will make use of analyses and research regarding the use 
of aggressive tax planning, in order to see to what extent the different strategies are used. 
 Transfer pricing  5.1
There are two types of analysis possible when looking at internal prices. The first one is a 
direct analysis where we compare the market prices on a product or service with the internal 
prices used by the MNC, to check if the MNC is breaking the arms-length principle. The 
second one will be an indirect analysis through the use of regression, where the focus will be 
on different ratios, such as the profit margin, that are affected by the activity we are looking 
for.76  
5.1.1 Direct Analysis 
Bernard et al. has studied the transfer prices used by U.S. based exporters during the 1990s, 
and finds significant differences in the deviation of prices, on the same products, exported to 
countries with different tax and tariff rates.77 Swenson78 and Clausing both find a strong 
correlation between different countries tax rates and the import prices to the U.S., on studies 
of transfer prices on goods imported to the U.S., respectively between 1981 - 1988 and 1997 
- 1999. Clausing finds that a 1% lower tax rate in the exporting country will lead to a 1,8% 
lower transfer price, compared to the prices to non-related parties.79 
                                                
76 Balsvik et al. 2009 
77 Bernard et al. 2006 
78 Swenson - 2000 
79 Clausing, 2003 
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5.1.2 Indirect Analysis 
Klassen et al. studied geographic income shifting done by 191 U.S. multinational 
corporations in response to worldwide tax rate changes during 1984 - 1990. The analysis 
shows that after Ronald Reagan´s tax reduction in 1986, pre-tax profitability for U.S.-
multinationals grew by 10%.80 Harris et al. studied the transfer-pricing practises of a pooled 
sample of American multinationals from 1984-1988, and found that MNCs with affiliates in 
tax havens had significantly lower U.S. tax liabilities than other comparable firms, proving 
that aggressive transfer pricing by the MNCs.81 
Nordeng and Sanderud studied multinationals headquartered in Norway from 1999 - 2006, 
and found that Norwegian multinationals with affiliates in low tax jurisdictions reported 
lower profits than comparable domestic corporations during this period of time.82 They also 
found a tendency towards that profits are shifted to typical tax havens, such as Ireland, 
Switzerland and Singapore. In 2009, Balsvik et al. found empirical evidence that profit is 
being shifted both into Norway from high tax countries, and out of Norway and into low tax 
countries. The analysis was based on numbers from 1992 - 2005, and they assume that the 
total loss of tax revenue, due to the MNCs aggressive use of transfer pricing, might be as 
high as 30% of total possible tax income from foreign corporations. These results were 
tested and confirmed by Møen & Tropina in 2012, who found that foreign MNCs have 4,5 
percentage points lower taxable profits than comparable Norwegian domestic firms. They 
also found that Norwegian MNCs have 2,5 percentage points lower taxable profits than 
comparable domestic firm, indicating that Norwegian firms are less aggressive in their 
transfer pricing than their foreign competitors.83 Møen & Tropina assume that the loss of tax 
revenue might be as high as 40% of possible tax income.  
The Swedish taxation law allows the authorities to correct transactions breaking the arms-
length principle. The largest case regarding transfer pricing in Sweden took place in the 
1980´s, when Shell International Petroleum Company was accused of having over-invoiced 
                                                
80 Klassen et al. 1993 
81 Harris et al. 1993 
82 Nordeng & Sanderud, 2012 
83 Skjult - pages 60 - 63 
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its Swedish daughter, AB Svenska Shell, with up to 198 million SEK between 1976-1981.84 
In more recent years, Swedish AB Tetra Pak was in December 2010 found guilty by a court 
in Malmö, for having received only 3% contribution on research and development costs from 
its Swiss owner TPI, a contribution the court meant should have amounted to 7% following 
the transfer pricing principles by OECD.85  
 Optimization of Capital Structure 5.2
5.2.1 Analysis of debt 
Desai, Foley and Hines (2004) find that MNCs have a competitive advantage in comparison 
with domestic companies due to advantages related to the use of internal debt. By using U.S. 
data, MacKie-Mason (1990)86 and Graham (1996)87 shows evidence that tax benefits are one 
of the factors affecting the firm’s financial structure.  
Jarle Møen, Dirk Schindler, Guttorm Schjelderup and Julia Tropina (2011) find that if we 
were to observe a sudden 10% tax increase in MNCs with affiliates in no more than two 
countries, the leverage would increase by 7.4% in the high-tax country. 88 Huizinga, Laeven 
and Nicodème (2006)89 find that an overall 10 percent tax increase in one country is found to 
increase the debt-to-asset ratio in that particular country by 2.44%, by using a sample of data 
from 33 European countries over the period from 1994-2003.  
Torbjørn Hægeland (2003)90 tried to find the relationship of the capital structure between 
affiliates and companies owned by foreigners and the equity share of Norwegian companies. 
The numbers, from 1998, show a significant negative correlation between foreign ownership 
and the equity share of the company. A Norwegian company that is wholly owned by foreign 
                                                
84 Arvidsson - p. 255 - 321 
85 Förvaltningsrätten i Malmö; Mål nr. 11615-11; Judgement of 30.12.2013 
86 Gordon et al. 1990 
87 Graham, 1996 
88 Møen et al. 2011 	  
89 Huizinga et al. 2006 
90 Hægeland, 2003 
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investors had a 7 percentage points lower equity to asset ratio compared to companies held 
solely be Norwegian investors.  
In 2005, Han-Suck Song did an analysis on different determinants of the capital structure of 
Swedish firms based on about 6000 companies and panel data from 1992 to 2000. According 
to Han-Suck Song (2005), the non-debt tax shield91 has a significant positive effect on the 
short-term debt ratio as well as a negatively correlation with the long-term debt ratio 
(Swedish short-term debt amounts to almost 50%).  
5.2.2 Analysis of internal debt 
Desai, Foley and Hines (2004) investigate the allocation of debt in American MNCs. Their 
study concludes that if the MNC experience an increase of 10% in the corporate tax rate 
level, the respective affiliate in that particular country will increase their leverage by 2.5%. 
The internal debt has a higher elasticity (i.e. it is more sensitive) than the external debt, with 
respectively 0.35 to 0.19. Further on, Desai, Foley and Hines (2004) states that MNCs uses 
internal debt selective when it is cheaper than external or there is a possibility for an 
arbitrage.  
Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein (1994) compares internal versus external debt financing and 
concludes that these do not have the same characteristics. MNC’s internal interest costs are 
equal to zero, which supports the argument of Stonehill and Stitzel (1969), which is that 
equity and internal debt should be treated equally.   
Büttner and Wamser (2007) found that the use of internal debt decreases as MNCs open up 
for minority ownership.  
	  
                                                
91 When total debt is decomposed into short-term and long-term debts 
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 Use of indirect company structures, trusts and tax 5.3
havens 
Desai et al. finds that large international firms, typically with extensive intra-firm trade and 
high R&D costs, are more likely to use tax havens than others.92 Mintz & Weichenrieder did 
research on the use of holding companies in 2010, and found that MNCs from most 
countries in the world make use of advanced financial structures,93 indicating that size is an 
important factor for the MNCs choice of financial structure.  
Janskÿ & Prats studied more than 1500 MNCs operating in India, and reported that in 2010, 
the companies with links to tax havens reported 1,5% less profits, paid 17,4% less in taxes 
per unit of assets and 30,3% less in taxes per unit of profit than the other firms.94 Dyreng & 
Lindsey finds that U.S. multinationals with affiliates in at least one tax haven have a tax 
burden on worldwide income that is approximately 1,5% lower than firms with no ties to tax 
havens.95  
Despite the two previous researches, Møen et al. finds that most MNCs use direct structures 
instead of indirect structures. 96 This might question the effect of such indirect structures, or 
might again indicate that size is the key driver for creating such financial structures, and that 
the strategy is not suitable for smaller firms.  
Publish What You Pay found that ten of the worlds most powerful oil, gas and mining 
companies own 6038 subsidiaries, and that one third of these are based in secrecy 
jurisdictions,97 while the Norwegian newspaper, Aftenposten, found that 10% of the 
companies on the Oslo Stock Exchange had offices in tax havens.98 This gives a clear 
                                                
92Desai et al. 2006 
93 Weichenrieder & Mintz,; 2010  
94 Janskÿ et al.; 2013 
95 Dyreng & Lyndsey; July 2009 
96 Møen et al.; 2011   
97 Publish What You Pay; September 2011 
98 Gustavsen, Øyvind; Aftenposten 18. Oct. 2011 
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indication that such structures are common in Norway as well, but due to the lack of research 
we are not able to draw any conclusions that this is purely for fiscal reasons.  
As expected, we were not able to find any research regarding the use of trusts in tax haven 
subsidiaries. This information is well hidden by the companies and the trusts, and little 
research has been done on this field.  
 Conclusion 5.4
On the basis of the literature presented in this chapter, we can, with a high level of certainty, 
conclude that both transfer pricing- and thin capitalization-strategies are being frequently 
used by MNCs both in Norway, Sweden and in the U.S. There is reason to believe that 
Norwegian MNCs are less aggressive in their transfer pricing, compared to their foreign 
competitors, something we might be able to see in our analysis of Coca-Cola Enterprises 
Norge.  
The use of indirect financial structures is not clear due to lack of research, and it will 
therefore be interesting to see if we can find that such structures are being used by the two 
companies we are studying. The research we have presented states a wide usage of tax 
havens on a global basis, indicating that we might find an extensive use of such tax havens 
as well as other high secrecy jurisdictions, when analysing TCCC and IKEA.  
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6. Analysis: The Coca-Cola Company 
We will now use The Coca-Cola Company (TCCC) as an example, and analyse how a 
multinational company uses the different strategies we have explained in order to minimize 
its tax burden. By doing so, we hope to gain a better understanding of how the different 
strategies work in real life, and of how the global tax system is exploited by one of the 
largest MNCs in the world.  
Since TCCC is listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), we are fortunate enough to 
get access to the company´s financial statements and some information regarding their 
ownerships and other activities. Still, we have to inform that any information about the tax 
strategies used by TCCC, as well as information regarding most of their foreign operations, 
is well hidden within the walls of the company. We have throughout this thesis only been 
using public information and assumptions based on the theory presented, as well as the Orbis 
Database.99 
 Coca Cola at a glance 6.1
In general, TCCCs business can be divided into two main operations:  
1. Concentrate Production 
2. Bottling Investments Operation 
 
The cornerstone of TCCCs operation is the production and sale of the Coca-Cola syrup, 
internally referred to as "Merchandise 7X". The company generates revenue by selling 
concentrate and syrup to authorized bottling and canning operations (bottlers), who then 
produce it into finished beverages for further distribution and sales. The bottlers are either 
company-owned or -controlled by TCCC through its bottling investment operation, or they  
operate as independent bottling partners. All bottlers have separate contracts (Bottler´s 
Agreements) containing authorization to prepare, package, distribute and sell specified 
                                                
99 A database drifted by Bureau Van Dijk, containing information on 120 million private companies.  
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products under strict regulations from TCCC, where TCCC normally has complete 
flexibility to determine both prices and terms.100  
 Coca Cola and taxes 6.2
TCCC´s annual report states: "Our annual tax rate is based on our income, statutory tax 
rates and tax planning opportunities available to us in the various jurisdictions in which we 
operate".101 In other words, the company confirms that tax planning is a central part of their 
operations, and that opportunities to avoid taxes are taken advantage of.  
In the fiscal year of 2013, Coca Cola reported $2,851 million in taxes on taxable income of 
$11,477 million, showing an effective tax rate of 24,8%, significantly lower than the U.S. 
tax-rate of 35%.  
	  
2013	  
Net	  Revenues	   46	  854	  
Operating	  Costs	   36	  626	  
Operating	  Income	   10	  228	  
Financial	  Operations	   1	  249	  
Income	  Before	  Tax	   11	  477	  
Tax	   2	  851	  
Net	  Income	   8	  626	  
(In	  $	  mill.)	  
Figure:	  6.1	  
We have to remember that Coca-Cola is dealing with income and taxes in all existing 
countries in the world, except for two. They are therefore also dealing with as many tax rates 
- most of them lower than the U.S. tax rate, as well as tax rules, serving a valid reason for 
why the effective tax rate is lower than 35%. But this does not tell the whole story. The 
number reported as total income tax for the company includes both current and deferred tax. 
The deferred tax is an unreliable source of income for the government, being that the tax 
might be paid next year, or never. The interesting number is therefore the one telling how 
                                                
100 Information is found in TCCCs 2013 Annual Report Form 10-K 
101 Coca Cola Co.; Annual Report Form 10-K released on the 27.2.14 
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much tax the company actually paid, signifying money out of the company´s accounts and 
into the hands of the government. The general rule in taxation is that profits from one year, 
are taxed in the following year. This might not be the same for every tax jurisdiction in the 
world, but in the long run, the total tax payments in one year seen in comparison to the 
taxable income from the previous year, will give the net effective tax rate for the company. 
For 2012, the effective tax rate will therefore be found by dividing the actual amount of tax 
paid in 2013 (2162) by the pre-tax income for 2012 (11 890). By using this rule, the effective 
tax rates from 2008 - 2012 are as follows:  
Year	   2013	   2012	   2011	   2010	   2009	   2008	  
Pre	  Tax	  Income	  
	  
11	  809	   11	  458	   14	  207	   8	  946	   7	  506	  
Actual	  Tax	  Paid	   2	  162	   981	   1	  612	   1	  766	   1	  534	   1	  942	  
Effective	  Tax	  Rate	  
	  
18,3	  %	   8,6	  %	   11,3	  %	   19,7	  %	   20,4	  %	  
(In	  $	  mill.)	  
Figure	  6.2	  
As we can see from the numbers, the effective tax rates for the previous five years vary a lot, 
but are all well below what we can expect for a U.S. company. We will in the following part 
of this chapter try to figure out how TCCC is able to achieve such low effective tax rates. 
We also believe that TCCC is able to keep some of its income of its U.S. books, and 
therefore completely free of tax, by using advanced financial structures, including the use of 
tax havens and trusts. We will start by looking at the company´s corporate structure. We will 
look at its ownerships in various affiliates, and try to figure out how The Coca-Cola 
Company is put together.  
 Corporate structure 6.3
Being that TCCCs business operation is clearly divided into two parts, concentrate 
production and bottling investments, we would expect the corporate structure to be so as 
well. This is however not the case. Studying the ownership structures of TCCC leads you 
into a maze of multiple-company ownerships, where you, more often than not, end up with a 
loose thread in the form of a company in a high-secrecy jurisdiction. Our guess it that this 
advanced corporate structure is created for fiscal reasons. A quick search for "coca cola" in 
the Orbis database leaves you with 2590 companies spread out across the globe. TCCC also 
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operates under several different names, in jurisdictions with a high level of secrecy. This 
means that you would have to be an insider in order to reveal the actual structure of the firm. 
We have used the information available to us, including the Orbis database, and will now 
present our theory of how some of the company is put together:  
 
6.3.1 Concentrate/Syrup Production 
All production of the Coca-Cola concentrate is controlled and performed directly by TCCC 
and its subsidiaries, and all revenue created by this activity falls to TCCC. As of December 
31st 2013, TCCC had 10 concentrate-manufacturing facilities in North America, and 17 
outside of North America.  
We have been able to locate three of these facilities:  
Atlantic Industries (Egypt) 
Atlantic Industries (Ireland)  
Pacific Refreshments PTE LTD (Singapore) 
 
All three are subsidiaries of the Cayman Islands based Atlantic Industries, located in the 
well-known Ugland House in George Town.  The information gives us reason to believe that 
the whole concentrate operation has been located in a tax haven, being kept away from the 
United States and its tax authorities. When investigating Atlantic Industries further, we find 
that the company has affiliates in Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Dominica, Great Britain, 
Hong Kong, India, Liechtenstein, Pakistan, and in the US. The spread locations of the 
affiliates give us further reason to believe that this is the concentrate-manufacturing 
operation, positioned to distribute concentrates worldwide.  
	  
Figure	  6.3	  
 59 
Atlantic Industries is a wholly owned subsidiary of The Coca-Cola Export Corporation, 
daughter of TCCC. The Coca-Cola Export Corporation operates in Ireland through their 
branch, coincidentally also named Atlantic Industries. By using this structure, TCCC will be 
able to either keep portions of the earnings from the concentrate operation off the US-books, 
or tax portions of the income at a favourable rate in Ireland. As we mentioned in chapter 3.3, 
one of the advantages of setting up a branch in a foreign subsidiary, is that losses may be 
added directly to the parent company. TCCC might be able to allocate costs to the affiliate in 
Ireland, run a deficit and use this deficit to reduce taxes on parent level. With this in mind, 
we believe that revenue from the concentrate operation is sent through Atlantic Industries in 
Cayman Islands, while costs are allocated to the branch in Ireland. The structure might be an 
example of a Killer B, or a similar setup as the ones explained in 4.3.3, used in order to route 
foreign income back to the parent company free of tax.  
 
6.3.2 Bottling investments 
Occasionally, TCCC make investments in bottling operations in order to increase control of 
the Coca-Cola operations and in order to increase profits. The bottling-investment segment 
has become an increasingly more central part of TCCCs strategy, and as of 31.12.13, TCCC 
had the following ownership in some of the largest Coca-Cola bottlers: 
Bottler	   Ownership	  
Coca-­‐Cola	  FEMSA,	  S.A.B.	  De	  C.V.	   28,00	  %	  1	  
Coca-­‐Cola	  HBC	  AG	   23,15	  %	  	  
Coca-­‐Cola	  Amatil	  Limited	   29,00	  %	  2	  
Coca-­‐Cola	  Enterprises	  (CCE)	  	   0%	  3	  	  
Arca	  Continental	  S.A.B	  de	  C.V.	  	   8,60	  %	  4	  
1	  Owned	  through	  The	  Inmex	  Corporation	  (US	  based	  subsidiary)	  
2	  Owned	  through	  Coca	  Cola	  Hldings	  Overseas	  Ltd.(Delaware,	  US).	  	  
3	  TCCC	  acquired	  CCE	   in	  2010,	  separated	  the	  North	  American	  business	   into	  a	  new	  company	  called	  Coca-­‐Cola	  
Refreshments	   Inc.,	   and	   transferred	   the	  Norwegian	  and	  Swedish	  bottling	  operations	   to	  New	  CCE	  which	  was	  
then	  listed	  on	  the	  NYSE	  
4	  Shares	  owned	  directly	  by	  TCCC?	  
Figure	  6.4	  	  
As mentioned earlier, and as we can see from this list, TCCC prefers indirect ownership, and 
usually through advanced corporate structures. A good example of this is the ownership in 
Coca-Cola HBC AG.  
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Figure	  6.5	  	  
Coca-Cola HBC AG is the worlds second largest independent Coca-Cola bottler, and 
operates in 27 countries in Europe and in Nigeria. As we can see, the ownership of the 
23,15% is through an advanced structure of companies. Barlan Inc., Overseas Parent, 
Refreshment Product, and Atlantic Industries shared the ownership of HBC AG until April 
2013, when these holdings were consolidated to CCHBC Grouping. In the same month, a 
shareholders´ agreement between KAR-TESS Holding and TCCCs affiliates, limiting the 
total ownership of HBC AG for the two parties to 44%, was terminated.102 This is clear from 
the combined ownership share of 47,45%. KAR-TESS Holding SA is owned through a 
structure going from Luxembourg to Cyprus, British Virgin Islands and Bahamas before 
ending up in Switzerland, a structure that smells of secrecy and possible tax avoidance. A 
theory is that Coca-Cola may have used KAR-TESS as a trust company, being able to 
control a larger number of shares while looking like a minority owner. The termination of 
the shareholder´s agreement might indicate that we can expect a change in the ownership of 
Coca-Cola HBC AG in the near future. Something worth mentioning is that in the SEC-
filing regarding HBC AG, all seven corporations, from CCHBC Grouping to TCCC, are 
represented and signed for by the same person. This indicates that these companies main 
activity is to function as holding companies, with little or no activity apart from this.  
                                                
102 The Coca-Cola Company, SEC-filing 13G of Feb. 14th 2014 
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 The use of subsidiaries in tax havens 6.4
As we have seen, TCCC has affiliates in several of the locations regarded as tax havens, and 
they seem to play a central role in the company´s operations. When TCCC acquired Coca-
Cola Enterprises in 2010, affiliates in British Virgin Islands, the United States Virgin Islands 
and the Cayman Islands were transferred to TCCC.103 Switzerland, Luxembourg, Ireland, 
Hong Kong and Singapore are examples of locations from where TCCC holds several of its 
subsidiaries. When explaining how MNCs use offshore subsidiaries to avoid taxes, Senator 
Carl Levin explains that: "Many are little more than a post office box set up to allow 
corporations to move profits to the low- or no-tax havens rather than reporting that income 
to the United States." By running the company from Delaware,104 TCCC is able to set up 
shell-corporations, as described in chapter 3.5, and subsidiaries in tax havens, purely for 
fiscal reasons. As we saw in part 4.3.3, the Delaware Loophole is reckoned as a popular tax 
minimization strategy, where the scheme is that royalties and other revenues from foreign 
subsidiaries are paid to Delaware, free of tax. The fact that TCCC and many of its closest 
daughter companies are located in Delaware, states the fact that the use of tax havens is an 
important part of the company´s tax minimization strategies. By running the company from 
Delaware, the company will be able to reduce its taxes, and the low transparency will make 
this hard for tax authorities to figure out.  
Atlantic Industries is currently one of more than twelve thousand companies located in the 
Ugland House in the Cayman Islands. The Ugland House is known as one of the many office 
buildings in George Town, where companies such as TCCC locate their subsidiaries in order 
to stay away from US-taxation.105 We believe that most of the revenue from selling the 
Coca-Cola concentrates ends up in the Cayman Islands, while costs are allocated to the 
branch in Ireland, reducing the total tax burden at corporate level as explained in chapter 3.3. 
There is no income or corporation tax in the Cayman Islands;106 therefore, as long as the 
foreign earnings remain off the books in the U.S., these earnings will be free of tax for the 
                                                
103 The Coca-Cola Company, SEC-filing 13G of Feb. 14th 2014 
104 Coca Cola, 1919  
105 Evans, 2004 
106 Cayman Islands Information & Knowledge Portal 
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company. The criteria for keeping such earnings of the books in the home country, is the so-
called indefinite reversal criteria, saying that the undistributed earnings must be invested by 
the foreign subsidiary indefinitely.107 Having a look at the annual reports from The Coca-
Cola Company, the amount of foreign earnings that fulfil the indefinite reversal criteria is 
absolutely breath taking: 
Year	  (20-­‐xx)	   03	   04	   05	   06	   07	   08	   09	   10	   11	   12	   13	  
Undistributed	  
Foreign	  Earnings	  (bn)	   8,2	   9,8	   5,1	   7,7	   11,9	   14,1	   19	   20,8	   23,5	   26,9	   30,6	  
Growth	  	     19	  %	   -­‐48	  %	   51	  %	   55	  %	   18	  %	   35	  %	   9	  %	   13	  %	   14	  %	   14	  %	  
Figure	  6.6	  	  
As we can see from our findings, The Coca-Cola Company has been able to keep massive 
amounts of earnings off its books in the United States, adding up to $30,6 bn. in 2013. The 
company repatriated $6,1 bn. during the Jobs Creation Act in 2005, paying an effective 
interest rate of 5,25%108. Since then, there have been no reports of repatriated earnings, 
meaning that the rest of the undistributed earnings have been "left" abroad, as a foreign cash 
reserve, something we can see by the growth since 2005. For U.S. tax authorities, this means 
a huge loss in important tax income. As we described earlier regarding efficient tax 
structures, we assume that all costs have been allocated to affiliates facing higher tax rates, 
being that it would be inefficient to allocate any costs to an affiliate located in a tax haven, 
unless it is a branch such as Atlantic Industries in Ireland. This means that if the tax system 
in the United States was working as it should, all of these earnings would have been taxed at 
a rate of 35%, adding a massive $10,71 bn. in tax income over the past ten years. In others 
words: due to a dysfunctional tax system, the United States has lost $10,71 bn. in tax income 
from TCCC over the past ten years. And this is just from one company. Imagine the total 
amount of earnings from all the other American multinational companies, never making it to 
the American books, thus never being taxed by the American authorities.  
The reason why we wrote that the undistributed earnings have been "left" abroad is that this 
is in most situations not the case. The fact is that a lot of this cash is deposited in various 
banks around the world, so it is actually circulating through the economy as we speak, not 
                                                
107 From Coca-Colas Annual 10-K form of 2013 
108 The Coca-Cola Company, Annual Report 10-k Form of 2006 
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stuck in a foreign bank account like many people assume. The undistributed earnings cannot 
be used to finance business operations, but still, with this cash reserve TCCC will be able to 
lend money and issue bonds at a very low tax rate, meaning that the cash is still very much 
useful. The companies also find ways to bring that cash back home, as shown in chapter 
4.3.3. TCCC amounts their cash reserve held by foreign companies to $18,3 bn. as of 
December 31st 2013.109 This shows that $12,3 bn. of the $30,6 bn. in undistributed foreign 
earnings have already been put to use by the company. The phrase that profit is trapped or 
left abroad, with no use to the company or to the economy, is wrong, and we will elaborate 
more on this in chapter 10.  
 Internal pricing 6.5
We will now check if we can find any signs to prove that TCCC is manipulating their 
transfer prices, i.e. that the company´s transfer prices differ from the market price, breaking 
the arms-length principle. Our major challenge in doing so is the lack of information 
available to us. The main products that TCCC is selling internally are the concentrates and 
syrups, used by bottlers to produce the different beverages. Optimally, we would have 
performed a direct analysis of the internal prices used by TCCC on these products, compared 
to the market prices. Since these products are not traded in the open market, a direct analysis 
is not possible to perform, and in the absence of these prices, we will have to perform an 
indirect analysis of the company. By using the Orbis-databse, we are able to find information 
and income statements from various Coca-Cola companies worldwide. When looking for 
irregularities in the transfer prices, we will be checking the profit margins of the various 
affiliates, in connection to the tax rates in the countries in which the various affiliates are 
operating. The profit margin is defined as gross income divided by total sales, and as 
described in chapter 4.4, this is one of the ratios that might indicate the use of tax 
minimization strategies. It is natural to assume that if TCCC is in fact manipulating its 
transfer prices, we will be able to see this in the form of high profit margins in countries with 
low tax rates, and low profit margins in countries with high tax rates. In other words, we will 
see signs that TCCC is shifting profits from high-tax affiliates to low-tax affiliates, as 
described in our theory chapter. 	  
                                                
109 TCCC; 2013 Annual Report on form 10-k; p. 63 
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Figure	  6.7	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Tax	  rates	  are	  taken	  from	  KPMG´s	  "Corporate	  tax	  rates	  table".110	  	  	  
Switzerland:	  Corporate	  tax	  rate	  of	  17,92%,	  but	  lowered	  to	  8,50%	  due	  to	  the	  Swiss	  "Mixed	  company"	  laws.	  (KPMG,	  2011)111	  
Luxembourg:	  Corporate	  tax	  rate	  of	  29,22%,	  lowered	  to	  5,84%	  because	  of	  an	  80%	  reduction	  on	  qualifying	  IP-­‐income	  (KPMG,	  2013)112	  
In Figure 6.7 the companies are sorted by profit margin, from the lowest to the highest. In 
order for us to have a clear proof that Coca Cola is shifting profits through manipulating 
their transfer prices, we would have to see a clear decrease in tax rates along with the 
increase in profit margins. As we can see from the table this is not the case, and we can 
therefore not make a conclusion regarding Coca Cola and their possible profit shifting.  
	  
Figure	  6.8	  
In Figure 6.8 we can see a slight trend towards increasing profit margins following the 
decrease in tax rates. It might be possible to prove this theory with a statistical analysis, 
using numbers from several Coca-Cola companies over a longer period of time, but we will 
not perform such an analysis in this thesis. According to Yahoo Finance, the average profit 
margin in the beverage and soft-drink industry is 11,80%,113 and as we can see from the 
                                                
110 KPMG; Corporate Tax Rate Table of 2014 
111 KPMG; International Corporate Tax - IP Location Switzerland 
112 KPMG; Luxembourg - A Hub For Intellectual Property 
113 Taken from Yahoo Fiance: http://biz.yahoo.com/p/348conameu.html 02.04.2014 
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chart, 10 out of the 43 companies operate with lower margins. It is also interesting to see	  that 
both TCCC and The Coca-Cola Export Corporation, along with CCE Luxembourg, are the 
three companies with the highest profit margins, being that the first two are two of the main 
companies located in the tax haven Delaware, and that the last one is located in 
Luxembourg, a country known for its favourable tax regime.  
As we mentioned, the main possibility for profit shifting within TCCC is in the trading of 
concentrates and syrups. There are also possibilities in the production and sales of the bottles 
and cans produced by the company, and when the finished drinks are sold from bottlers to 
distributors. There are however big risks connected to manipulating these prices, especially 
when selling finished products, in that the actual arms-length prices are easier to measure 
and that any deviation from this price is illegal. A good example of this is the accusations 
towards TCCC made by a Cook Islands audit office. On January 28th 2013, New Zealand 
based Investigate Daily revealed that TCCC has been named in a Cook Island Audit Office 
investigation regarding a possible invoice scam. The possible scam includes Cook Island 
Trading Company (CITC), importer of Coca-Cola, and the Cook Island customs, with which 
CITC has allegedly had a hidden and very lucrative deal since 1980. During this period of 
time, CITC has been allowed to separate content and packaging on the products supplied by 
Coca Cola. By doing so, CITC has paid a normal 40% import tax on the content, but only a 
10% tax on the packaging. In addition to this, by telling the customs that the actual can itself 
was worth nearly half the total value of the product, CITC has been able to save large 
amounts of tax costs.114 Another example is TCCCs operations in Vietnam, where the 
company has failed to achieve a profit ever since commencing operations in 1994, even 
though earnings have increased since the start up.115 Still, TCCC has decided to invest more 
money in the country. To us, this might be an indication that the company is actually making 
money in the country, but by using aggressive transfer pricing they are able to shift this 
profit away from the country and avoid local income tax.  
                                                
114 Investigate Daily; 2013 
115 Tuoi Tre News, 06/10/2013 
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 Royalties 6.6
There is little or no information regarding TCCCs royalty charges for various patents, 
trademarks or trade secrets. What we do know is that the famous Coca-Cola syrup is being 
kept a trade secret. Holding an asset a trade secret instead of a patent has its advantages in 
that there is no application process or costs, it has immediate effect, and most importantly; it 
is not limited in time and therefore continues indefinitely as long as the secret is not 
revealed. The main risk is that there does not exist any exclusive rights for the use of the 
asset, and if anyone is able to copy it, anyone will be able to use or even patent it. 116 As 
described in chapter 4.1.7 regarding royalties, the OECD Model Tax Convention does not 
require the compensated right to be registered, meaning that TCCC can charge a royalty for 
the use of its syrup. It will therefore be natural to assume that the company does so, but any 
information on the amount of royalties the various affiliates face is not available to us. 
By using the Orbis-database, we know that TCCC is in possession of several patents. But 
without knowing anything about these patent, and about the possible royalty charges 
affiliates pay in order to use the connected assets, we do not want to speculate more around 
this aspect.  
 Thin Capitalization 6.7
TCCC might be able to reduce taxes by using debt, both internal and external, where interest 
payments will reduce taxable income. The use of internal debt is favourable, being that the 
interest payments never actually exits the company, and therefore is not seen as a cost but as 
a way of shifting profits from one affiliate to another. If TCCC uses internal debt 
aggressively in order to reduce taxes, we might be able to see this by comparing equity ratios 
to tax rates in various affiliates.  
 
 
 
                                                
116 WIPO; Patents or Trade Secrets?  
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Figure	  6.9	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Figure	  6.10	  
If the company is using internal debt to shift profits, we might be able to see this through a 
trend of low equity-ratios in countries with a high tax rate, and high equity-ratios in countries 
with low tax rates. As we can see from Figure 6.10, there is a slight trend pointing towards 
an increased level of equity in countries with low tax rates, indicating that TCCC is using 
debt as a profit-shifting device. We have to emphasise that we do not have any information 
regarding TCCCs use of internal debt, and as far as we know, no research has been done in 
this field. We are therefore not able to confirm any findings, and can only refer to the trend 
shown in Figure 6.10. 
 Optimal minority ownership structure 6.8
As shown in chapter 4.1.6, minority ownership is believed to have the same effect on profit 
shifting as tax rates, meaning that increased minority ownership gives the management 
incentives of shifting profits away from the affiliate and into a wholly owned affiliate. If this 
is the case, we would be able to see this in the form of higher profit margins in wholly 
owned subsidiaries compared to affiliates with minority owners. We will not analyse this 
any further, but would like to recommend others to test this theory.  
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 Transparency 6.9
A factor that really increases our suspicion towards TCCC and their possible use of 
aggressive tax planning is the level of transparency related to financial information, business 
information and ownerships information. The high number of companies, many of them 
under various names, the complicated ownership structures and the lack of information 
regarding these ownerships, the lack of information regarding foreign owned subsidiaries 
and their finances. All of this just makes us more certain that TCCC is using aggressive tax 
planning in order to reduce tax payments.  
 Conclusion 6.10
Through this analysis, we have seen how TCCC tends to use complicated ownership 
structures, where tax havens seem to play important roles. We believe that the use of tax 
havens, trusts and complicated ownership structures, including shell companies, is part of 
TCCCs tax minimization strategies, and we believe that by running their concentrate 
operation through the Cayman Islands based Atlantic Industries, TCCC is able to channel 
big amounts of income through these countries at a zero or low tax rate. The fact that TCCC 
is located in Delaware increases the company´s possibilities of shifting profits free of tax. 
We have shown how TCCC takes advantage of the American tax system, keeping a total of 
$30,6 bn. of foreign income away from the U.S. books. This equals $10,71 bn. in lost tax 
income for the U.S. government over the past 10 years. Further, we have discovered a slight 
indication that TCCC might be using transfer pricing and thin capitalization in order to avoid 
taxes. These findings are however unsure due to the lack of available information. However, 
the corporate structure of the company, with a base in Delaware and affiliates in several tax 
havens, provides a good platform for the use of such strategies. The lack of transparency in 
the company´s finances and operational activities increases our suspicion that the company is 
using aggressive strategies in order to avoid taxes.	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7. Analysis: Coca-Cola Enterprises Norge AS 
We will in this chapter analyse Coca-Cola´s operations in Norway, and see if we can find 
any signs of aggressive tax planning here. Since Coca-Cola Enterprises Norge AS is not 
listed on the stock market, the amount of available information is reduced compared to 
TCCC. We are therefore restricted to public general information, such as general income 
statements, balance sheets and cash-flow statements. This information, both regarding Coca-
Cola and the various comparable firms, is taken from Proff.no, and our analysis is based on 
the theory previously presented in this thesis.	  	  
 Introduction 7.1
Coca Cola Enterprises Norge AS (CCEN) is a daughter company of the US-based Coca-Cola 
Enterprises Inc., and is responsible for the production, sales and distribution of the Coca 
Cola Company´s products in Norway, and has been since 1997.117 With a relatively high tax 
rate of 27%, Norway is one of the countries where we would expect companies to use their 
strategies in order to minimize taxable income, and we would like to see if, and if so, how 
this is done.  
The company ran a deficit in 2012, for the first time since 2002, meaning that the effective 
tax rate was negative. The effective tax rates from the previous six years are as follows:	  	  
Year	   2012	   2011	   2010	   2009	   2008	   2007	  
Pre	  Tax	  Income	   -­‐89	  880	   120	  748	  	   67	  911	  	   185	  235	  	   226	  634	  	   201	  211	  	  
Tax	  	   -­‐24	  161	   35	  155	  	   21	  069	  	   53	  542	  	   66	  526	  	   58	  360	  	  
Tax	  Rate	   -­‐26,88	  %	   29,1	  %	   31,0	  %	   28,9	  %	   29,4	  %	   29,0	  %	  
Figure 7.1  
Because of the lack of information, we are not able to find out how much tax the company 
actually paid in this period. Keeping in mind that this is a domestic affiliate operating in a 
country with a highly developed tax system, we assume that the actual amount of tax paid 
does not deviate much from these numbers.  
                                                
117 Information taken from Coca-Cola Norge´s homepage 
 72 
Considering the location and the developed Norwegian tax system, the tax saving 
possibilities for the parent occurs in the structural and operational part of the affiliate, 
starting with the corporate structure.	  	  
 Corporate Structure 7.2
CCEN is wholly owned by CCE Holdings Norge AS, both companies located at the same 
address in Lørenskog, Norway. CCE Holdings Norge AS is wholly owned by Coca Cola 
Enterprises Belgium SPRL. This company is according to Bloomberg a joint venture of 
Bottling Holdings (Netherlands) B.V. and Coca Cola Enterprises Luxembourg SARL, 
holding 77,33% and 22,67% each respectively.	  	  
Figure 7.2 
As we can see from the figure, the ownership continues through three companies located in 
Luxembourg, before ending up at the parent in Atlanta. This advanced corporate structure, 
with several affiliates located in high secrecy countries, might offer CCE a favourable tax 
position. Belgium is known for its many lucrative tax-treaties, while both Luxembourg and 
the Netherlands are known for offering tax saving possibilities to MNCs. With this in mind, 
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we believe that this advanced ownership structure is created for fiscal reasons, giving CCE 
possibilities of decreasing taxes on income made in Norway.  
An important aspect of this corporate structure is that we do not know if TCCC has any 
direct or indirect ownership in CCE. In 2010, TCCC acquired "the old" CCE, separated the 
European segment and listed it on the NYSE as "new" CCE. TCCC does not have any 
ownership in new CCE according to their annual report 10-k form of 2013, so this is the 
information we will have to follow. With this in mind, it would be natural to assume that 
TCCC would put a high price on the goods sold to CCE, in order to maximize profits. 
However, TCCC has to consider that CCE is a listed company that needs to perform well in 
order to attract shareholders. There is also a need for bottlers to perform well if they are to 
continue to work for TCCC through the Bottler´s Agreement. For the simplicity of our 
analyses, we will assume that TCCC trades goods with CCE at arm´s length prices, and that 
CCE is responsible for deciding the transfer prices when trading internally with its different 
affiliates.  
 Internal pricing 7.3
CCEN is responsible for the production of Coca-Cola beverages in Norway, meaning that 
they will have to purchase concentrates, bottles and cans, and any other input that is needed 
to make the beverages according to the Bottler´s Agreement signed with TCCC. This means 
that there will be internal trading between CCE and its affiliates, and CCEN, where CCE 
will set transfer prices in order to maximize profits on corporate level. We are not able to 
perform a direct analysis of these prices due to the lack of information, and will therefore 
perform an indirect analysis where we will compare CCEN´s profit margin to the profit 
margins of comparable firms in the beverage-industry in Norway. We believe that	  CCE sells 
the input from an affiliate in a low-tax jurisdiction, and that it maximizes the internal prices 
in order to shift profits away from Norway and into the low-tax affiliate. If this is the case, 
we might be able to see this in the form of lower profit margins for CCEN compared to 
domestic firms in the same industry. As we already know from the previous analysis of 
Coca-Cola´s international operations, the average profit margin for the beverage and soft 
drink industry is 11,80%, so this will be a good platform for comparison. We will compare 
CCEN with some of the largest beverage companies in Norway. A problem with this 
comparison is that several of these companies are also in the business of brewing and selling 
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beverages containing alcohol, an industry which has an average profit margin of 27,10%.118 
It will therefore be natural to assume that the profit margins of the brewers will be higher 
than the profit margins for companies in the pure soft drink and beverage industry. Once 
again, the profit margin is defined as gross income divided by total sales, indicating the 
efficiency of the firm and the amount of profit the company gains compared to total sales.	  	  
Profit	  Margin	  
Company	   2012	   2011	   2010	   2009	   2008	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  Soft	  Drink	  Industry	   	   	   	   	   	  
Coca-­‐Cola	  Enterprises	  Norge	   -­‐3,6	  %	   5,0	  %	   2,9	  %	   7,8	  %	   9,3	  %	  
Oskar	  Sylte	  Mineralvannsfabrikk	   10,4	  %	   7,9	  %	   6,0	  %	   4,8	  %	   4,9	  %	  
Roma	  Mineralvannfabrikk	  	   5,8	  %	   4,5	  %	   0,8	  %	   6,4	  %	   5,3	  %	  
Industry	  Average	   11,8	  %	  
	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  Soft	  Drink	  &	  Brewery	  Industry	   	   	   	   	   	  
Aass	  Bryggeri	  AS	   8,2	  %	   6,9	  %	   8,6	  %	   1,7	  %	   3,6	  %	  
Grans	  Bryggeri	   9,6	  %	   7,9	  %	   7,0	  %	   5,8	  %	   2,7	  %	  
Hansa	  Borg	  Bryggerier	   3,7	  %	   1,6	  %	   2,1	  %	   3,1	  %	   5,1	  %	  
Ringnes	  AS	   6,8	  %	   9,2	  %	   12,6	  %	   11,8	  %	   8,8	  %	  
Industry	  Average	   27,1	  %	  
	   	   	   	  Figure	  7.3	  119	  
The figure indicates that the general Norwegian soft drink- and brewery-companies have a 
profit margin that is clearly below that of the average industry, and that this is also the case	  
for CCEN. The profit margin for CCEN has been falling over the last five year, and it is the 
only company in this test with an operating deficit. The two other soft-drink companies have 
increased profitability during the past year. This is however not an ideal test, being that there 
are few comparable companies to Coca-Cola, and few companies that can match their 
position and size. Because of this, we cannot focus too much on these findings. 
Looking at the income statement, we can see that the sales have increased for CCEN over 
the past year, and so have wages and depreciation. Other operating costs have increased a 
lot, something that could be a coincident related to actual operating matters, or it could be 
due to an increased use of tax minimization strategies by CCE, shifting profits away from 
                                                
118 Average profit margin taken from: http://biz.yahoo.com/p/346conameu.html 
119 Numbers and Income Statements found on proff.no  
 75 
Norway. CCE reported that operating expenses at corporate level decreased by 1,5% in 2012 
compared to 2011.120 The increased operating costs in Norway does not represent the trend 
at corporate level, thus strengthening our theory that profit is being shifted out of Norway. 
Keeping in mind that Norway has just decreased their corporate tax rate by one percentage 
point, we might have expected a situation where the profit margin in this affiliate would have 
increased. However, these findings might not	  be related to tax avoidance at all, and might 
have their natural, operational explanations.	  	  
In	  1000NOK	   2012	   2011	   Change	  in	  %	  
Revenue	   2	  477	  123	   2	  415	  304	   2,6	  %	  
Cost	  of	  goods	  sold	   1	  292	  202	   1	  247	  118	   3,6	  %	  
Wages	   709	  423	   677	  574	   4,7	  %	  
Depreciation	   231	  139	   156	  552	   47,6	  %	  
Other	  operating	  costs	   347	  181	   222	  204	   56,2	  %	  
EBIT	   -­‐102	  822	   111	  856	   -­‐191,9	  %	  
Figure	  7.4	  
Without seeing a clear trend over a period of time, it is hard to come to any conclusion 
regarding Coca-Cola Enterprises´ use of internal prices to minimize taxes in their Norwegian	  
affiliate. The findings we have made here can have their natural reasons, still, it is hard to 
imagine how the company can increase sales while at the same time turn a profit into a 
deficit, regarding their position in the market. This will be an interesting thing to look into 
for the years to come.	  	  
 Pricing of royalties 7.4
As we have explained in chapter 4.1.7, royalties are paid in order to use a resource owned by 
someone else. In this example, the different affiliates pay a fee to TCCC in order to use their 
brand and concept.121 With a high degree of certainty, we can assume that these rights are 
owned by a Coca-Cola affiliate in a tax haven, probably in the Cayman Islands, thus this 
income will be sent to an affiliate in a tax haven and will be tax free for the company. With 
this in mind, it will be natural to assume that Coca Cola will set the royalty fees as high as 
                                                
120 Coca-Cola Enterprises Inc.; Annual Report on Form 10-k 2012  
121 Zimmer; 2009 - Internasjonal inntektsskatterett, 
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possible in high tax affiliates, in order to move profit to a tax haven and reduce their overall 
tax burden. An increased use of royalty payments, in order to shift profits from Norway to a 
tax haven, might explain the increased operating costs causing the deficit in CCEN. There is 
however a lack of information when it comes to the various affiliates, and detailed income 
statements and internal payments are only available to insiders. We have, for this reason, 
decided not to speculate around the amount of royalties paid by CCEN, due to the fact that 
this would only be regarded as guessing and will not be very useful for our results in this 
thesis.  
 Thin Capitalization 7.5
The tax system in Norway makes it profitable for MNCs to increase interest payments from 
their foreign subsidiaries located here. By leveraging the Norwegian affiliates, the increased 
interest expenses will be eligible for deduction against taxable income, thus decreasing tax 
payment in the country. By comparing the level of debt in CCEN to the levels of debt in 
other companies in the same industry, we can analyse if CCEN has a lower equity ratio than 
what is normal. A finding like this might indicate that CCE is using thin-capitalization 
strategies in order to reduce taxable income in the Norwegian affiliate.  
Equity	  ratio	  
Soft	  Drink	  Industry	   2012	  
Coca-­‐Cola	  Enterprises	  Norge	   50,6	  %	  
Oskar	  Sylte	  Mineralvannsfabrikk	   49,1	  %	  
Roma	  Mineralvannfabrikk	  	   38,4	  %	  
Soft	  Drink	  &	  Breweries	   	  	  
Aass	  Bryggeri	  AS	   58,9	  %	  
Grans	  Bryggeri	   54,8	  %	  
Hansa	  Borg	  Bryggerier	   34,5	  %	  
Ringnes	  AS	   16,3	  %	  
Figure	  7.5	  	  
As we can see from out findings, CCEN actually has a normal to higher equity ratio than 
what seems to be average in these industries. Compared to Ringnes AS, which is a 
subsidiary of the large MNC Carlsberg Group, CCEN has a much higher equity ratio, which 
reduces our suspicion that CCE is shifting profit out of Norway through the use of thin 
capitalization.	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 Conclusion 7.6
In our analysis of CCEN, we have been able to find an advanced ownership structure, where 
ownership is passed through multiple high-secrecy countries, such as Belgium, Netherlands 
and Luxembourg, before ending up at CCE in the United States. This business structure 
represents possibilities for tax avoidance, and by looking at the deficit from CCEN we 
believe that such tax avoidance might be taking place. However, we have not been able to 
see clear irregularities with regards to thin capitalization or internal pricing when comparing 
profit margins and equity ratios with other firms in the industry. A high increase in costs 
over the last year might be seen as a sign that the use of tax minimization	   strategies has 
increased, but this trend needs to be evaluated over time, and we cannot draw any 
conclusions on the basis of this information. The way we see it, the highly developed tax 
system in Norway might make the country a less attractive location for MNCs wishing to 
avoid taxes.	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8. Analysis: IKEA  
We will in this section try to see how one of the world largest furniture retailers, IKEA,122 
takes advantage of the tax minimization strategies available. IKEA inherits a sophisticated 
organizational structure. Sophisticated in terms of that it is engineered to minimize their total 
tax obligations and to maintain family control of the company. We want to see to what 
extent that is true and if so, how does it correlate with the theory described, and our 
theoretical propositions.  
We start by describing IKEA’s general structure, before we in the next chapter go back to its 
roots and investigate to what degree IKEA can still be called Swedish, and to what extent it 
avoids Swedish taxation. 
 IKEA at a glance 8.1
In 1982, the founder wanted to develop an ownership structure that secures IKEA’s 
independence and a long life123. He therefore formed IKEA Group, which was and still is 
owned by a foundation in the Netherlands, Stichting INGKA Foundation124. Today, using 
Orbis database and public information, there exists in total 3 groups that can be linked to the 
Stichting INGKA Foundation or the Ikea Group. Figure 8.2 illustrates how these groups 
interconnect.	  
	  
Figure	  8.1	  
                                                
122 Reuters, 2008 
123 Ikea, 2014a 
124 Ikea, 2014b 
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Figure	  8.2	  
According to Inter Ikea Group’s webpage, Inter IKEA Group and INGKA Group are 
independent from each other and have different owners. Ikea Group counts for 303 
warehouses. The remaining 52 warehouses are owned by Inter Ikea Group, Ikano Group and 
various franchisees.125 We will give a detailed briefing in the following chapters on how 
each of the three mentioned groups operate.  
 Ikea Group 8.2
Stichting INGKA Foundation is the final majority owner of 85% 126of the Ikea worldwide 
warehouses, making it the largest franchisor. The Ikea Group is in charge of the entire 
supply chain, varying from its distribution centre and business development, to factoring and 
procurement.  Each warehouse is owned by INGKA Holding B.V., which again is owned by 
Stichting INGKA Foundation. Each warehouse is either controlled by or ran by an Ikea hub 
in each Ikea-country, assisting with national staff and support functions. Next to the 
Stichting INGKA Foundation are the IKEA Foundation, which runs the charity side of the 
foundation, and the Stichting IMAS, which manages dividends from INGKA Holding BV.127  
                                                
125 Inter Ikea Group, 2014a 
126 303/355 = 85% 
127 Bloomberg, 2012a 
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8.2.1 Tax payments 
There is little financial information available, other than what is to be found in Orbis. By 
looking at figure 8.3 we find that, in terms of U.S. dollars128, the INGKA Holding B.V. 
revenues the last 6 years have been between $30bn - $38bn per annum.129 By using the profit 
margin (%) we can compute the implicit EBT130 by adjusting the formula: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡  𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 = 𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 → 𝐸𝐵𝑇 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡  𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 ∗ 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒	  
The effective tax rate is then calculated from the stated tax payments divided by the implicit 
earnings before tax (EBT).131 By accumulating the total tax payments from 2008 – 2013 and 
dividing it on accumulated earnings before tax from the same period, we find an average 
effective tax rate of 18% for INGKA Holding B.V. We also find an average profit margin132 
in the same time span of 14%. 
We can start by comparing the effective tax rate with the average effective tax rate of the 
largest U.S. and EU multinationals. In the time span from 2001- 2010, Avi-Yonah and 
Yaron Lahav (2011)133 find that U.S. and EU multinationals have an effective tax rate of 
respectively 31% and 35%. These deviate 13 and 17 percentage points from INGKA 
Holding BV´s effective tax rates134.  
In a PWC report on corporate income tax – a global analysis, however, the effective tax rate 
among EU and OECD countries was respectively 20.6% and 23.1% which is closer to 
INGKA Holding BV’s implied effective tax rate in 2013 (2.6 and 5.1 percentage points).  
 
                                                
128 Ikea lists its revenue in terms of euros and has a steady revenue growth, currency adjusted. Since the Eurodollar 
fluctuates, the growth isn’t that notable when listed in dollars.  
129 The Ikea fiscal year is from September – August  
130 The earnings before tax is not listed in Orbis under INGKA Holding B.V. 
131 Neither the net income nor the effective tax rate is listed in Orbis under INGKA Holding B.V. 
132 EBT on Operating Revenue 
133 Avi-Yonah, R. & Lahav, Y., 2011. 
134 The average numbers from Avi-Tonah, R. & Lahav (2011) are from the period 2001-2010. We compare these numbers 
to INGKA Holding BV effective tax rate in 2013.  
 81 
INGKA	  Holding	  B.V.	   2013-­‐08	   2012-­‐08	   	  	   2008-­‐08	  
Source:	  Orbis	  (2014)	   milUSD	   milUSD	   	  	   milUSD	  
Operating	  Revenue	   38	  102	   35	  178	   	  	   32	  150	  
Sales	   37	  728	   34	  088	   	  	   31	  198	  
COGS	   20	  893	   19	  828	   	  	   n.a.	  
Gross	  Profit	   17	  209	   15	  350	   	  	   n.a.	  
Other	  operating	  expences	   11	  901	   10	  959	   	  	   28	  240	  
Taxation	   1	  026	   876	   	  	   805	  
Implicit	  Earnings	  Before	  Tax	  (EBT)*	   5	  416	   4	  930	   	  	   4	  172	  
Implicit	  Net	  Income**	   4	  390	   4	  053	   	  	   3	  367	  
Effective	  tax	  rate***	   18.9%	   17.8%	   	  	   19.3%	  
Profit	  Margin	  (%)	   14,2	   14,0	   	  	   13,0	  
Gross	  Margin	  (%)	   45.2	   43.6	   	  	   n.a.	  
Other	  operating	  expenses	  fraction	  of	  sales	   31.5%	   32.1%	   	  	   90.5%	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Assumptions:	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
*Profit	  margin	  multiplies	  by	  operating	  revenue	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
**EBT	  -­‐	  taxation	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
***Taxation	  /	  (Taxation+Implicit	  Net	  Income)	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Figure	  8.3	  
8.2.2 Internal pricing 
Since there are several Ikea Group-affiliates located in high secrecy jurisdictions, it will be 
difficult to jump to any conclusions on whether or not the Ikea Group actively uses transfer 
pricing. As mentioned, incentives to use transfer prices is to shift profits away from high-tax 
jurisdictions. By comparing the profit margin to the jurisdiction’s corporate tax rate, one 
would believe to find a negative correlation between these if the case is that debt shifting is 
being used. Unfortunately, since public assessable information is limited, a significant 
correlation is difficult to derive. 
INGKA Holding B.V. holds 89 subsidiaries according to Orbis. By searching individually on 
all 89, the total number of affiliates amounts to 571. We consider all of these as they most 
likely do business within the group. Of the 571 affiliates, only 75 provided satisfactory fiscal 
information for running the comparison of the affiliate’s profit margin to the country’s 
corporate tax rate. 
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The correlation between the profit margin and the country’s tax rate of 13% of the group’s 
affiliates135 does not comply with the theory. With a correlation of only -0.02 we can’t say if 
Ikea strategically is using transfer pricing as a tax minimizing strategy or not136.  
	  
Figure	  8.4	  
	  
Figure	  8.5 	  
                                                
135 75/571 = 13% 
136 The full list of the affiliates with listed profit margin in Orbis is to be found in appendix x 
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Although we cannot conclude that Ikea uses transfer pricing as a strategy to reduce their tax 
obligations, certain suspicions arise. One of our questions regards the lack of transparency 
and the fact that the first Swedish registered company of the hierarchy in the Ikea Group is 
on the retail level. 
We will now consider the profit margin for the top operating revenue affiliates under 
INGKA Holding B.V. and calculate the implicit profit margin for the rest of Ikea Group’s 
operation. If the implicit profit margin is higher, relative to the profit margins listed below, 
we can suspect that profit is shifted away from these countries. The numbers are collected 
from Orbis. The requirement is that the affiliate is a subsidiary of INGKA Holding B.V. (and 
Stichting Ingka Foundation) and has publicized operating revenue and profit margin for 
2013. We have not emphasized its industry as the purpose behind this exercise is to find the 
implicit profit margin which is independent the affiliate’s industry. 
	  
Figure	  8.6	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The figure above shows that 45.1% of INGKA Holding BV’s operational revenue stems 
from the companies listed. These companies had a weighted average tax rate of 27% and a 
weighted average profit margin of 4.6%. From figure 8.4 we can see that the parent, INGKA 
Holding BV has a profit margin of 14.2% in the same period, which mean that the remaining 
54.9%137 must have an average profit margin that accounts for this.   
Post	  
Operating	  revenue	  
mil	  USD	  
31/08/2013	  
Percent	   Profit	  margin	  
INGKA	  Holding	  BV	  (from	  figure	  9.4)	   	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  102	  	   100,0	  %	   14,2	  %	  
Observed	  companies	  (in	  figure	  9.7)	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  184	  	   45,1	  %	   4,6	  %	  
Remaining	  for	  INGKA	  Holding	  BV	   	  20	  918	  	   54,9	  %	   22,1	  %	  
Figure	  8.7	  
Ikea has restricted the view/openness for the remaining 54.9% of its operational revenue. 
This part must account for a profit margin that is almost 5 times138 as high, in order to add up 
to the parent’s profit margin. Taking this into consideration, it might be a very clear 
indication of Ikea’s profit shifting activities. The transfer pricing can take place anywhere 
within the supply chain. 
8.2.3 Royalties 
The Ikea concept is owned by Inter Ikea System B.V. Ikea’s worldwide franchises marketer 
and seller. Inter Ikea System B.V. has set the franchise fee to 3%139 of sales-revenue, 
meaning that for every dollar spent in any given Ikea store, three cents goes directly to Inter 
Ikea System B.V. in the Netherlands, which are then routed through or forwarded to Inter 
Ikea Holding SA in Luxembourg. Interogo Foundation in Lichtenstein own Inter Ikea 
Holding SA. The Interogo foundation’s owner remains unknown, as they are protected by 
                                                
137 100% - 45.1% = 54.9% 
138 22.1% / 4.6% = 4.8 
139 Inter IKEA Group Annual Report 2012 
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the foundation’s bylaws.140 We will in chapter 8.3 look closer on exactly where the royalties 
end up. 
The royalties are tax exempted. We will now show how much the Ikea group would have 
had to pay if they weren’t. We collect the numbers from figure 8.4(INGKA Holding BV) 
and assume that the only change is that the franchise fee of 3% is added on the EBT (i.e. 
neither additional revenues nor costs except the tax difference) 
Figure	  8.8	  
From Figure 8.8 we can see that the Ikea group reduced its EBT-post by 17.1% and that the 
franchise fee accounted for a reduction in tax obligations of $150 million, or 12.8%. 
 
8.2.4 Thin Capitalization 
We will in this chapter do the same as we did when finding the implicit profit margin for 
those affiliates that do not have published fiscal information. We mentioned that affiliates 
with a high debt-to-asset ratio most likely would be located in a high tax jurisdiction, as the 
interests paid are tax deductible. Likewise, the low tax affiliate is more likely to be the 
group’s internal bank. The theory described implies a negative correlation between the 
                                                
140 SVT, Uppdrag Granskning,  2011 
 
141 Franchise fee fraction of total EBT without franchise fee. 
 
142 By accumulating the total tax payments from 2008 – 2013 and dividing it on accumulated earnings before tax from the 
same period we find an average effective tax rate of 18% for INGKA Holding B.V. Decreased post: fraction of reduced tax 
compared to tax obligations without franchise fee.  
INGKA Holding BV 
milUSD 2013 
With 
franchise fee 
(figure 9.4) 
Without 
franchise 
fee 
Difference Reduction in % 
Sales  $ 37 328  $ 37 328  -  - 
Franchise fee, 3% of sales  $ 1 120  $0  -$1 120  - 
EBT141  $ 5 416  $6 536  +$1 120  -17.1% 
Taxation (18%)142  $ 1 026  $1 176  $150  -12.8% 
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country’s tax rate and the equity-to-asset ratio (i.e. if a country has a high tax rate, the group 
fills this affiliate with debt). By using the same companies as in the previous section we get a 
correlation value of -0.25, which is an indication that the theory complies with those 
companies offering public fiscal information within the Ikea Group.	   
	  
	  
Figure	  8.9	   	  
Company	  name	   Country	  
Total	  assets	  
mil	  USD	  
2013	  
Equity	  
mil	  USD	  
2013	  
Equity	  to	  
Asset	  
Ratio	  
Tax	  rate	  
IKEA	  CESKA	  REPUBLIKA,	  S.R.O.	   CZ	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  199	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  121	  	   60,8	  %	   19,0	  %	  
IKEA	  INDUSTRY	  HULTSFRED	  AB	   SE	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  162	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  	   39,2	  %	   22,0	  %	  
IKEA	  BRATISLAVA,	  S.R.O.	   SK	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  72	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  	   28,8	  %	   23,0	  %	  
IKEA	  PTY	  LIMITED	   AU	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  641	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  168	  	   26,3	  %	   30,0	  %	  
DISTRIBUTION	  SERVICES	  IKEA	  FRANCE	   FR	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  	   25,6	  %	   33,3	  %	  
IKEA	  A/S	   DK	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  318	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	  	   24,6	  %	   25,0	  %	  
IKEA	  ITALIA	  PROPERTY	  S.R.L.	   IT	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  638	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  153	  	   24,0	  %	   31,4	  %	  
IKEA	  COMPONENTS	  AB	   SE	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  	   23,7	  %	   22,0	  %	  
UAB	  IKEA	  INDUSTRY	  LIETUVA	   LT	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  115	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  	   22,0	  %	   15,0	  %	  
IKEA	  OY	   FI	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  86	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  	   20,8	  %	   24,5	  %	  
IKEA	  DEVELOPPEMENT	  SAS	   FR	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  697	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  135	  	   19,3	  %	   33,3	  %	  
IKEA	  LIMITED	   GB	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  286	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  233	  	   18,1	  %	   23,0	  %	  
IKEA	  PROPERTIES	  INVESTMENTS	  	  LTD	   GB	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  010	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  182	  	   18,1	  %	   23,0	  %	  
MEUBLES	  IKEA	  FRANCE	   FR	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  677	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  118	  	   17,4	  %	   33,3	  %	  
IKEA	  OF	  SWEDEN	  AKTIEBOLAG	   SE	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  214	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  	   17,1	  %	   22,0	  %	  
IKEA	  IRELAND	  LIMITED	   IE	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  125	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  	   16,9	  %	   12,5	  %	  
IKEA	  AB	   SE	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  978	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  134	  	   13,7	  %	   22,0	  %	  
IKEA	  ITALIA	  RETAIL	  S.R.L.	   IT	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  938	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  121	  	   12,9	  %	   31,4	  %	  
IKEA	  BELGIUM	   BE	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  361	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  	   10,4	  %	   34,0	  %	  
IKEA	  NEDERLAND	  B.V.	   NL	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  628	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	  	   4,8	  %	   25,0	  %	  
SUM,	  45.1%	  of	  Ikea	  Group's	  companies	  
	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  223	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  763	  	   17,2	  %	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Figure	  8.10	  
By comparing the affiliates listed in figure 8.9 to the home furnishing stores on yahoo 
finance143 we find that: 
Post	   Equity-­‐to-­‐asset	  ratio	  
Home	  Furnishing	  Stores	   13.9%	  
Ikea	  subsidiaries	  from	  figure	  9.10	   17.2%	  
Difference	  percentage	  points	   3.3%	  
Figure	  8.11	  
The Ikea subsidiaries listed in figure 8.9 have a 3.3 percentage point higher equity to asset 
ratio than the Home furnishing stores index on Yahoo finance. We can therefore not 
conclude whether or not Ikea actively uses thin capitalization as a tax minimization strategy. 
It is worthwhile to notice that INGKA Holding BV had an Equity-to-asset ratio in 2013 of 
69.5%144 which is substantial higher than its subsidiaries. However, we can’t conclude 
anything solely based on these numbers as we need every subsidiary within the group’s 
fiscal information to see whether or not the Ikea group shifts debt/profit.  
                                                
143 Franchise fee fraction of total EBT without franchise fee 
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8.2.5 Non-profit charity organization 
As mentioned in the chapter introduction, the Stichting INGKA foundation is a non-profit 
charity organization, without tax obligations located in the Netherlands. We want to see how 
much it saves annually in taxes, after adjusting for charity, by having a legal entity as a 
charity organization. In chapter 4.6 we wrote about how the IRS has defined the 
consequences of being a private foundation in order to ensure that a tax-exempt organization 
serves public and not private interests. An organization generally has to pay out 5% of the 
fair market value of its non-charitable assets. With that in mind we will try to estimate a 
market value on Stichting INGKA foundation and compare 5% of the market value with 
what they give away today.  
Since Ikea is not listed on the stock market we use Yahoo Finance’s industry centre to 
convert the P/E for the market capitalization. We use the earnings from INGKA Holding BV 
which is wholly owned by Stichting INGKA foundation to value Stichting INGKA 
foundation. As of 12th of May 2014 the average P/E on Home furnishing stores was 17.3.  
Implicit	  net	  income	  2013	  INGKA	  Holding	  BV	   $4.39bn	   Figure	  9.4	  
P/E	  average	  Home	  furnishing	  stores	   17,3	   Yahoo	  finance	  12th	  of	  May	  2014	  
Market	  capitalization	  INGKA	  Holding	  BV	   $76bn	   4.39	  *	  17.3	  
5	  %	  of	  market	  capitalization	   $3.8bn	   -­‐	  
Figure	  8.12	  
With a market capitalization of $76bn it makes it the 86th largest company in the world145. 
This places the company just in front of the Norwegian oil company, Statoil. Compared to 
other foundations it is almost twice as large as the Bill & Melinda Gates foundation, which is 
$40bn as of September 2013.146 
The IKEA Foundation gave away €101million147 to charity in 2013, equalling $133 million 
USD. 
 
                                                
145 PWC, 2013 
146 Gatesfoundation, 2014 
147 Ikea Foundation, 2014 
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IKEA	  foundation	  charity	  post	  2013	   $0.133bn	  
Royalty	  tax	  savings	  2013	  (figure	  9.9)	   $0.150bn	  
5%	  of	  Stichting	  INGKA	  foundation	  market	  capitalization	  (figure	  9.4)	   $3.8bn	  
Figure	  8.13	  
As we can see the scheme handsomely reward the Stichting INGKA foundation in terms of 
tax exempts. The Ikea group saves roughly $3.7bn, all else being equal, if the alternative was 
to use the U.S. as location for Stichting INGKA foundation instead of the Netherlands.148 
The overall scheme of using royalties also allows Ikea to save $150 million annually (figure 
8.14), making the net earnings between royalties and funds given to charity $17 million each 
annum in Ikea’s favor149.  
8.2.6 Chapter summary 
It is a challenge to conclude whether or not Ikea is actively using transfer pricing, thin 
capitalization or other tax minimizing strategies due to the lack of information. However, 
looking at the numbers presented in this chapter and our analysis, we clearly see huge 
deviations in several factors. Profit margins, transparency, equity-to-asset ratios, royalties, 
the effective tax rate and the charity fund location, all indicates that Ikea do indeed exploit 
tax minimization opportunities, especially when looking at the parent of the group, Stichting 
INGKA foundation, which is a non-profit foundation. The fact that Ikea saves more alone on 
royalty payments then it gives away to charity makes it very difficult to argue to maintain a 
status as a charity organization when the overall scheme tips the bottom line in favour to the 
group.  
	   	  
                                                
148 From figure 9.14: $3.8bn – $0.133bn = $3.667bn 
149 From figure 9.14: $0.15bn - $0.133bn = $0.017bn = $17million 
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 Inter IKEA Group 8.3
The Inter Ikea Group can be seen as the real Ikea, as it is the owner of the IKEA trademarks 
and the IKEA Concept150 (i.e. intellectual property assets). The purpose of this group is, 
according to their webpage, to secure a continuous improvement and secure a long life of the 
Ikea concept.151 The group has Interogo foundation as its main global ultimate owner152 and 
inherits a sophisticated structure.  
Figure	  8.14	  
	  
The Inter IKEA Group consists of four divisions, namely: 
• The Franchise Division 
• The Retail Centre Division 
• The Property Division  
• The Finance Division 
                                                
150 Inter Ikea Group, 2014b 
151 Inter Ikea Group, 2014c 
152 See attachment A 
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8.3.1 Tax payments 
Inter Ikea Holding SA, which is the parent of the division, is hiding large parts of their 
financial statement. We have collected numbers from the annual report153 and the remaining 
from Orbis. We have also derived the implied values between the numbers provided from 
our two sources. Unfortunately, the most recent figures are from 2011 and 2012. The result 
will still be relevant, even though the information is 2 years old. We use different EUR/USD 
ratios as this ratio has been quite volatile over the last 2 years. 
Figure	  8.15 
The figure above shows that Inter Ikea Holding SA had an effective tax rate of 0.17% and 
0.01%, respectively in 2011 and 2012.  This is a remarkably low effective tax rate compared 
to the average EU multinationals from PWCs report on corporate income tax – a global 
analysis, which was 20.6%. 20.6% on its earnings before tax in 2012 makes $89 million. We 
can assume that its financial revenues are exempted from tax payments (interests and 
dividends within the same group in EU aren’t taxable income). 
In addition, we notice that the franchise revenues that stems from Ikea’s original core 
industry, its warehouses, in 2011 and 2012 only accounted for 31% and 30%. The remaining 
70% of the revenues may origin from the other three divisions or other non-mentioned 
income sources in the franchise division.  
                                                
153 Inter Ikea Group, 2014d 
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8.3.2 Internal Pricing  
As mentioned under the Ikea group chapter, finding any evidence to prove the use of transfer 
pricing will be difficult. Inter Ikea Holding SA has 8 direct subsidiaries and 59 indirect, 
making it 67 in total. Of the 8 direct subsidiaries, few of them have public fiscal information 
available in Orbis. This make an analysis equal to the one we did under the chapter of the 
Ikea group more or less useless due the low number of observations.  
Country	   Company	  	   Profit	  Margin	  (2012)	   Tax	  rate	  	  
SE	   INTER	  IKEA	  INVESTMENTS	  AB	   -­‐25,94	  %	   22,00	  %	  
DK	   INTER	  IKEA	  CENTRE	  GROUP	  A/S	   -­‐0,54	  %	   25,00	  %	  
NL	   INTER	  IKEA	  SYSTEMS	  B.V.	   na	   25,00	  %	  
NL	   VASTINT	  HOLDING	  B.V.	   na	   25,00	  %	  
LU	   INTER	  IKEA	  HOLDING	  SA	   12,80	  %	   28,80	  %	  
	  Figure	  8.16	  
Based on single observations we can see that the affiliate in Sweden has a negative profit 
margin of almost -26% in 2012. However, due to the lack of public information we find 
problems extending the profit margin analysis.  
Ikea group and Inter Ikea group are two different legal entities. Although they write on their 
webpages that they are separate, they are co-owners in the Inter Ikea Centre Group A/S. 
Both Orbis and Inter Ikea’s annual report from 2012 confirm this. To say exactly why this 
has been chosen is very difficult, but it certainly open up the possibility for internal pricing 
between the two groups.  
 
8.3.3 Royalties 
Inter Ikea System BV received $1 120 million in royalties from the Ikea group in 2013154. 
We can find the value of the trademark in Inter Ikea’s annual report. We can read that the 
value for Inter IKEA System BV’s intangible assets equalled €9,000million, ($11,430 
million) as of 31st of December 2012. €9 000mil was paid from Inter Ikea Systems SA to the 
                                                
154 Assuming 3% of INGKA Holding BV sales 
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Interogo foundation in January 2012.155 Although the owner of the Ikea rights changed, Inter 
Ikea System SA still pays rents as the purchase was financed by156: 
IKEA	  Trademark	  value	  2013	   €	  9	  000mil	  ($11	  430mil)	  
Share	  premium	  issuance	   €	  3	  600mil	  ($4	  572mil)	  
Debt	   €	  5	  400mil	  ($6	  858mil)	  
Figure	  8.17	  
Both posts issued by Interogo foundation means that Inter Ikea System SA still has to pay 
rent and dividends to Interogo foundation, which will lower the group’s tax obligations. Inter 
Ikea System BV affiliate administer/lend the trademark. 
8.3.4 Thin capitalization 	  
We can find the following numbers from the Orbis-database: 
Inter	  Ikea	  System	  SA	  subsidiaries	  
Country	  
ISO	  
Code	  
Total	  
assets	  
mil	  USD	  
2012	  
Shareholders’	  
funds	  
mil	  USD	  
2012	  
Solvency	  ratio	  
(Asset	  based)	  
%	  
2012	  
INTER	  IKEA	  INVESTMENTS	  AB	   SE	   257	   27	   10.5%	  
INTER	  IKEA	  SYSTEMS	  B.V.*	   NL	   n.a.	   n.a.	  	   n.a.	  
VASTINT	  HOLDING	  B.V.	   NL	   487	   407	   83.4%	  
INTER	  IKEA	  CENTRE	  GROUP	  A/S	   DK	   3	  160	   924	   29.0%	  
Figure	  8.18	  
One indicator that strengthen the theory that Inter Ikea is actively using thin capitalization as 
a way to reduce tax obligations can be seen on the equity-to-asset ratio. The affiliates from 
Sweden and Denmark possess a relatively lower equity-to-asset ratio compared to the 
Vastint Holding BV, which is located in the Netherlands. The Netherlands is a very 
attractive jurisdiction for holding equity, as companies can commit private agreements with 
the tax authorities, dismissing them from tax payments. 
	  
                                                
155 Bloomberg, 2012b 
156 Inter Ikea Group, 2012d 
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8.3.5 Chapter summary 
The Inter Ikea group is substantially less transparent compared with the Ikea Group. There is 
very little public information available making it difficult to draw any conclusions. This in 
itself does however strengthen our research, as there is often a negative correlation between 
transparency and tax avoidance activity (low transparency = high tax avoidance activity). 
There seems to be strong indicators that Inter Ikea is using tax minimization strategies 
judging by the acquisition of the trademark, royalty arrangement and the equity-to-asset 
ratios and knowing that there is a company-link between the Inter Ikea group and the Ikea 
group. 
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 IKANO Group 8.4
We weren’t supposed to include the IKANO group in this thesis until we stumbled upon the 
company Ikano Bank GMBH located in Germany. As of 01.01.2014 this company was 49% 
owned by the Stichting INGKA Foundation under INGKA Holding BV, the parent in the 
Ikea group.157 The rest and the majority, 51%, was as mentioned owned by the IKANO 
group.158 Since IKANO also owns and operates IKEA stores in Singapore, Malaysia and 
Thailand and has a franchise agreement with the Inter IKEA System B.V.159 There has also 
been done relatively little research of the group. We therefore find it to be a very interesting 
group in the Ikea sphere. Bloomberg states that Ikano is the banking arm of Ikea.160 
The group erupted from the Ikea Company in 1988. It was owned by the Kamprad family 
and became an independent group of companies. Today it owns and manages companies 
within 4 sectors: Finance, Insurance, Retail Asia and Real Estate, according to their 
webpage:161 
                                                
157 New figures in Orbis show that as of the Ikano Bank GMBH is now 100% owned by the IKANO group. This number 
changed in March 2014. 
158 We have attached the ownership structure in attachment A for both the Ikea group, the IKANO group and the inter ikea 
group. 
159 IKANO Group, 2012 
160 Bloomberg, 2014 
161 Structure based on Orbis (attachment A) 
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Figure	  8.19	  
*We couldn’t find this Swedish located company mentioned in the Ikano - facts and figures 
2012 brochure. We could however find a company named Ikano Real Estate Holding BV 
that is located in the Netherlands and probably own the Swedish company. The holding 
company has chosen not to show any fiscal information so we choose to ignore this company 
further on. 
Ikano SA own 16 affiliates where 2 affiliates are either partly or wholly owned. Neither of 
the affiliates has listed its asset-value nor their net income in 2013.  
The parent of the group, IKANO SA had in 2012 (according to Orbis) the following fiscal 
information:  
IKANO	  SA	  
2012	  milUSD	  
EURUSD	  =	  1.27	  
Operating	  revenue	  /	  Turnover	  (orbis)	   $1	  163	  
Costs162	   $1	  000	  
EBT163	   $163	  
Taxation	  (orbis)	   $47	  
Net	  income	  (orbis)	   $116	  
Effective	  tax	  rate164	   28.8%	  
Profit	  margin	  (orbis)	   14.0%	  
Figure	  8.20	  
Compared to the two other groups, this is the group with the highest effective tax rate in the 
Ikea sphere (The effective tax rate is equal to the corporate tax rate in Luxembourg where it 
operates).  Although it has a relatively high effective tax rate, it doesn’t give us any value 
until we now what the costs are. Some of the costs are franchise fees to the Inter Ikea System 
BV, but we need more information than this. 
	  
                                                
162 Operating revenue minus EBT 
163 Profit margin times operating revenues 
164 Taxation divided on EBT 
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8.4.1 Internal pricing 
We will try to find indicators of internal pricing within the group by comparing profit 
margins between those companies which offer this information in Orbis. 
Figure	  8.21	  
The companies with the lowest profit margins are located in Norway and Sweden which is 
an indicator of internal pricing. We also observe that the affiliate with the highest margin is 
located in Luxembourg, which is as mentioned an attractive location for internal banks. 
	  
8.4.2 Thin capitalization 
By looking at the equity-to-asset ratio we can see that the differences between the 
Norwegian and the Swedish affiliate compared to the affiliate located in Luxembourg are 
very large. Due to these huge differences, we suspect that Ikano are also actively avoiding 
tax obligations. 
	  
8.4.3 Tax havens 
If we follow the company structure we reach the ICAF Antillen NV which is the owner of 
the group. This company is located in Curacao which forms part of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands and is an associate member of the European Community. ICAF Antillen NV is	  
registered at Curacao International Financial Services Association165 together with over 100 
                                                
165CIFA – homepage, 2014  
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other companies. The only information available on the company is a name that we weren’t 
able to link to the Ikea sphere. This is something that makes us believe that the Ikano group 
wants to hide something, increasing our beliefs that they are using tax minimization 
strategies.	  	  
	  
8.4.4 Chapter summary 
There is very little information on the Ikano group available. Combined with our intention to 
only write about the other two groups, we have chosen to limit this chapter to only a couple 
of pages. The reason why we felt the Ikano group was worth mentioning is due to the 
connection Ikano Bank GMBH has to the Ikea group, which we concluded actively 
minimizes its tax obligations. This led us to believe that the Ikano Bank GMBH affiliate was 
in the same boat as the Ikea group. Our suspicion increase when the Ikano and the Ikea 
group reorganized the ownership structure by changing the Ikano group ownership share 
from 51% before May 2014 to 100% after May 2014. Unfortunately, as mentioned, 
information is limited and we weren’t able to investigate the restructure further. 
 
 Conclusion 8.5
Our analysis of the three groups shows signs of an active use of tax minimization strategies. 
We have discovered a structure that we find difficulties explaining the incentives for, other 
than for pure fiscal reasons. By combining the three groups, including the 8 largest directly 
majority-owned sub-affiliates by Operating Revenue, and colour those located in countries 
defined as tax havens in the SOMO report166 red, we can clearly see that there is a high 
possibility that this setup is in fact a tax avoidance scheme (Figure 8.23). 
The mutual factor between these three groups is that at least parts of the income is tax free 
using three different strategies: 
                                                
166 Dijk et al., 2006 
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Figure	  8.22	  
By looking at the different group’s way of saving taxes, we can see that they are exploiting 
special legislations that would not have been possible outside tax havens. The strategic 
location, the low transparency, as well as the affiliates overall possibility of every tax 
avoidance schemes, it is very certain that the Ikea groups together are minimizing tax 
obligations. However, we were not able to provide solid proofs, but our conclusion is that 
they intentionally have chosen this structure to minimize tax burdens, saving huge amounts 
of money each year, as shown in figure 8.22.  
 
Figure	  8.23	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We can also conclude that Ikea can exploit the royalty legislations many tax havens have, as 
7 of the total 8 affiliates in the Inter Ikea Group is located in a tax haven (marked with red). 
The two first levels in the three groups are also located in tax havens, making the Ikea sphere 
very likely to interfere in tax avoidance.
9. Analysis: IKEA and Sweden 
We will go back to its origin, Sweden, and try to see if we can find indications of tax 
planning. This chapter, in addition to the rest of our analyses, will be limited to public 
information. We will use Orbis and proff.se to draw the corporate Swedish structure and 
attach this to the theory presented in the theoretical chapters. 
 Introduction 9.1
Ikea opened its first store in Stockholm, Sweden in 1958. The founder uses the word 
“Swedishness” to describe the success of how it has evolved into perhaps Sweden’s most 
well-known brand167. By using the Orbis database, we can see that Ikea (naturally) has a 
high activity in Sweden. By using the key words Ikea, Inter Ikea and Ikano we were able to 
find 162 Swedish companies that corresponded. We will limit our research by focusing on 
the Stichting INGKA foundation’s affiliates. 
INGKA Holding B.V. owns IKEA AB which is the warehouse coordinator in Sweden.168 
Sweden is a country where it is attractive to shift away profits, hence its tax rate of 22%. We 
expect findings that imply that the Ikea AB Company as a whole uses tax planning to 
minimize its tax obligations. There are 19 warehouses in Sweden, which work as 
branches169.  As the affiliates below Ikea AB in the hierarchy does not provide income 
statements, we use the statement from Ikea AB to investigate the level of tax planning.   
Description,	  
IKEA	  AB	  
2013-­‐08	  
milUSD	  
2012-­‐08	  
milUSD	  
2011-­‐08	  
milUSD	  
Turnover	   $3	  008	   $2	  928	   $3	  022	  
Pre	  Tax	  Income	   $115	   $187	   $123	  
Tax	  	   $34	   $38	   $29	  
Tax	  Rate	   29.3%	   20.3%	   23.9%	  
Figure	  9.1	  
                                                
167 Ikea, 2014a 
168 Every country has a coordinator controlling the country’s warehouses 
169 Information from Orbis by searching on Ikea AB  
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Based on the income statements we can see that the effective tax rate does not deviate that 
much from the corporate tax rate in Sweden, 22%. Due to the big difference however 
between the turnover and the earnings before tax, we suspect that there is one or many 
accountant cost posts in the statement that minimizes the EBT, making the tax payment 
relatively smaller in terms of money and not percentage.  
 Corporate structure 9.2
Ikea AB is the Ikea-coordinator in Sweden and is wholly owned by INGKA Holding B.V. 
Ikea AB is the parent of 17 Swedish companies which all fall under the Stichting INGKA 
foundation umbrella.  
	  
	  
Figure 9.2 
	  
	  
*Domo Invest AB holds two companies registered in Russia, Oao Domostroitel and 
Otkrytoe aktsionernow obshchestvo somostroitel.170 The last of these companies had in 2013 
1.988 employees registered. Most of its documentation is in Russian and we experience 
difficulties elaborating its functions in the corporate structure. 
By the structure seen above we can see that the Stichting structure in Sweden aligns with the 
Ikea concept described in the previous chapter. In difference, there	   are	   also	   other	   Ikea	  
groups	  located	  in	  Sweden,	  but	  we	  will	  continue	  focusing	  on	  this	  group.	  
                                                
170 From orbis 
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 Internal pricing 9.3
The affiliates under Ikea AB work as an independent unit that offers products and services to 
its group members. The warehouse´s products and IT-sites stems from the Ikea Indirect 
Material & Services AB, Ikea Supply AG and Ikea IT AB, close companies inside the Ikea 
group located in Sweden.  
There are incentives for the Ikea-group to sell products and services in low-tax jurisdictions 
to high-tax jurisdictions such as Sweden for the highest price possible. As we do not have 
information on internal sales available, we will use an indirect method comparing profit 
margins with similar domestic entities located in Sweden. As there are no incentives shifting 
profit for a group inside the same country, we believe to find lower profit margins at Ikea 
AB compared to the domestic ones.  
The Ikea AB differs from the other two stores as they operate differently since Ikea relies on 
more internal control. Regardless, we have chosen to compare Ikea with the two companies 
as they are, in our eyes, the best that we have to proceed with this analysis.  
PROFIT	  MARGIN	  
Company	   2012	   2011	  
Ikea	  AB	  (‘sept-­‐aug)	   6.4%	   4.1%	  
Mio	  AB	   4.4%	   4.2%	  
Chilli	  AB	   -­‐1.6%	   3.6%	  
Industry	  average171	  	   7.8%	  
	   	   	   	  Figure 9.3 
Judging by the table above, the difference isn’t remarkable between the companies located in 
Sweden. The numbers would have been more valuable if we had access to the company’s 
internal transactions, but since we are operating with public information we can’t conclude 
anything by looking at these numbers alone. Comparing last year’s available income 
statement with the latest one shows a higher increase in costs. With cost we mean everything 
between the revenue post and the EBITDA post which will with tax planning minimize 
taxes. We have made this “shortcut” due to the lack of information.  
                                                
171 Yahoo Finance, 2014 
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IKEA	  AB,	  milUSD	   2013-­‐08	   2012-­‐08	   Change	  in	  %	  
Revenue	   $3	  008	   $2	  928	   2.7%	  
Costs172	   $2	  858	   $2	  703	   5.7%	  
EBITDA	   $150	   $225	   -­‐33.3%	  
EBIT	   $112	   $188	   -­‐40.4%	  
Figure	  9.4 
The costs before EBITDA have increased by 3 percentage points relatively to the revenues. 
This might be explained by a Swedish marked that may be a bit saturated compared to other 
developing countries, but we still think it’s interesting to see how much the EBIT post is 
affected by those 3 percentage points. If the gap between changes in revenue and costs 
continues to grow it might be a sign that Ikea is expanding its costs in order to avoid taxes in 
their Swedish affiliates.  
 Royalty payments 9.4
Inter Ikea System BV receive 3% of the revenue from Ikea stores worldwide.173 Also 
Sweden’s Ikea AB is an entity under the Stichting Ingka foundation. Reporters question this 
arrangement as the founder is sitting on both sides, the giving and the receiving end. We will 
now see how the royalty arrangement affects the tax post. 
IKEA	  AB,	  milUSD	  
2013-­‐08	  
With	  FF	  
2013-­‐08	  
Without	  FF	  
Changes	  
in	  $	  
Changes	  
in	  %	  
Revenues	   $3	  008	   $3	  008	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
	  	  	  	  	  Franchise	  fee,	  3%	   $90	   0	   -­‐$90	   -­‐100%	  
Remaining	  costs	   $2	  768	   $2	  768	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
Pre-­‐tax	  income174	   $115	   $205	   +$90	   78.3%	  
Taxation	  (29.3%)175	   $34	   $60	   +$26	   76.5%	  
Net	  income	   $81	   $145	   $64	   79.0%	  
Figure 9.5 
                                                
172 Revenues minus EBITDA (not listed in Orbis database nor proff.se) 
173 Explained in chapter 8 
174 We assume that the royalty payment is constant in the absence from a franchise fee 
175 We use the same effective tax rate as calculated earlier for Ikea AB (2013) when calculating for the taxation for the 
royalty fee. 
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We can see that in absence of the franchise fee, Ikea AB would have to raise their tax 
payments with 76.5%, or $26 million more, each year (after adjusting for inflation and 
company growth). This is lost tax revenues for the Swedish society which have to be covered 
from other sources. If we compare the tax payments to the size of the Swedish economy, 
using a USDSEK on 6.6116 (orbis) we see that: 
Swedish	  National	  Budget176	   2013177	  mSEK	  
National	  revenues	   790.5	  
National	  Expenses	   921.4	  
Budget	  balance	  	   -­‐130.9	  
Ikea	  AB’s	  $26mil	   171.9	  
Adjusted	  balance	   40	  
Figure	  9.6	  
If we only consider one factor, all else equal, the Ikea AB’s tax exemption due to the 
franchise fee alone would have turned a SEK130 million deficit into a surplus of SEK40 
million for the Swedish government.  
 Thin capitalization 9.5
Since the interest payments are tax deductible in Sweden, the Ikea group has incentives to 
increase its debt-to-asset ratio filling the affiliate with internal (or external) debt. We will 
compare Ikea AB’s equity-to-asset ratio to the same companies as earlier.	   If Ikea is using 
this strategy we expect to find a relatively lower equity-to-debt ratio in Ikea AB relatively to 
the benchmark companies we use. 
Figure 9.7 
                                                
176 Ekonomifakta, 2014 
177 Forecast by Ekonomifakta, 2014  
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As we see from the table above, the Ikea AB affiliate has a substantial lower equity-to-asset 
ratio than its two national competitors. This implies that Ikea AB has higher interest 
payments and thus, higher interest tax deduction, strengthening the argument that Ikea AB 
possesses a tax favourable financial and ownership structure. 
 Conclusion 9.6
We have seen how Ikea in Sweden has an ownership structure that has a coordinator with a 
low profit margin, high costs, franchise fees and a low equity-to-asset ratio. Although we 
face troubles making solid conclusions due to the limited information, we strongly suspect 
intentional tax planning with the mission to minimize tax payments.  
We can with great certainty say that Ikea AB is removing $90mil in gross profit from 
Sweden and transferring this to the Ikea-concept owner, which is the Luxembourg based 
Inter Ikea System BV. That being said, we have only been focusing on the Stichting Ingka 
foundation, which funds the Ikea group. For a more comprehensive analysis we recommend 
looking at the whole Swedish sphere considering the 162 Ikea related companies that as of 
today are located in Sweden.	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10. Government actions 
 FATCA 10.1
The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) is a set of new regulations intended to 
reduce tax evasion in the United States. FATCA was enacted in 2010, and requires American 
institutions, taxpayers and foreign corporations with U.S. ownership interests to report to the 
IRS information regarding financial accounts held abroad.178 The regulations demand 
foreign financial institutions to report to American tax authorities any information regarding 
financial assets belonging to U.S. citizens.179  
As we have seen throughout this thesis, MNCs tend to shift profits from high tax countries, 
such as the United States, and into low tax countries where information is protected by a 
high level of secrecy in the finance sector. The problem for tax authorities in this situation is 
the lack of information and the low level of cooperation from some foreign financial 
institutions.  The IRS, or any other tax authority for that matter, does not have the authority 
to collect taxes in regions outside of their jurisdiction, and they cannot demand any 
information from foreign institutions. FATCA introduces the right to levy withholding taxes 
of 30% on international payments made from the U.S., to financial institutions that do not 
cooperate in sharing information. By doing so, the intention is to put pressure on the various 
financial institutions in order to make them share important information, not to generate 
higher tax revenue. 
The regulations introduce some challenges in creating systems for identification of the 
various companies and institutions, reporting and levying the 30% withholding tax. The 
FATCA-regulations therefore offer agreements to simplify these processes. In April of 2013,	  
Norway signed such an agreement with the United States, agreeing that Norwegian	  
institutions are to report to the Norwegian tax authorities, which will forward the 
information to the IRS.180  
                                                
178 U.S. Department Of The Treasury; 2014 
179 KPMG - FATCA; 2014 
180 PWC; 2011-2014 
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The European Commission has also proposed a European FATCA, intended to extend the 
automatic exchange of information between member states of the EU to also apply to 
dividends, capital gains, other forms of financial income and account balances.181 An 
interesting question to ask is if we should consider the introduction of a Norwegian FATCA. 
As shown in chapter 5, research has shown that taxable profit is being shifted out of Norway 
as well, reducing tax income for the government. The question would in that case be if such 
an investment would be worth it, meaning if the additional tax income created by such 
regulations would be higher than the costs created?  
The IRS has announced that 2014 and 2015 will be regarded as a transition period for 
FATCA, where institutions and agents acting in good faith will not be penalized for 
technical failures while getting the new regulations worked in.182 
	  
10.1.1 Global Transparency 
FATCA is a step in the right direction when it comes to increased transparency on a global 
scale. At the G20 meeting in Sydney in February 2014, the countries gave a green light for a 
global standard regarding automatic exchange of information, where implementation plans 
are supposed to be agreed upon on the next meeting, being held in September.183 Their goal 
is to develop and integrate a global standard for automatic and smooth exchange of tax 
related information between countries.  
On the 24th of March 2014, the member countries of the European Union agreed upon rules 
that will increase the amount of tax information exchanged by national authorities. This 
breakthrough came after five years of discussions, where Austria and Luxembourg objected 
to the proposed laws, fearing that it would hurt their financial sector. The two countries 
agreed upon the new legislations after the European Commission succeeded in negotiations 
with Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Andorra, San Marino and Monaco, five low-tax countries 
with similar financial sectors. The pressure provided by the FATCA regulations is also 
                                                
181 KPMG; 2013  
182 IRS; Notice 2014-33 
183 European Commission; February 2014 
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regarded as an important reason for why the countries decided to agree upon the new 
legislations. However, the rules agreed upon by the EU that are expected to be enforced in 
2017, will probably never be enforced because of the global standard that OECD will discuss 
in September.184 Still, the agreement is a step in the right direction, indicating that the EU is 
united in the work for a global standard for transparency, giving hope for the OECD 
standard.  
A recent positive change in Norway was presented in the revised budget on the 14th of May 
2014, saying that information on shareholders in Norwegian firms is to be constantly and 
automatically updated in a digital database.185 The companies are currently responsible for 
updating their lists of shareholders, an inefficient and expensive practise where the 
information is stored in a closed database and access has to be requested,186 thus making it 
easier for companies to hide ownership. It is not yet decided if the new database is to be 
open to the public or not.  
 ACE & CBIT 10.2
Tax systems following the general accounting principles allow deduction of interest against 
corporate income when determining taxable profits. This is the case for the three countries 
we have been looking at in this thesis, and is regarded as the natural way of treating interest 
in a tax perspective. However, this accounting principle creates an unbalanced relationship 
between debt and equity, giving companies incentives to increase the amount of debt for 
fiscal reasons. As we have seen in previous part of this thesis, the use of internal debt has 
grown to be one of the biggest tax minimization strategies used by MNCs, and causes huge 
losses for governments around the world.  
Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE) -system maintains the deductibility of interest 
payments, and introduces an additional deduction for equity. This creates neutrality between 
debt and equity, leaving capital income untaxed and thus removing the effects on investment 
behaviour. With the ACE-system, the corporations are only taxed on their operational 
                                                
184 Hirst; 24.3.2014 
185 Finansdeartementet; 2013-2014 
186 Dahl, Siri Gedde; 15.5.2014 
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revenue, meaning that total tax income for the government will decrease. This is solved by 
increasing corporate tax rates, or by increasing tax income from other parts of society. The 
system has been tested in several countries, showing various results. 
The CBIT-system removes deductibility for interest payments, making return on both equity 
and debt taxable at the corporate tax rate. A clear disadvantage of this system is that it 
increases the cost of capital, thus affecting investment behaviour of the firms. But at the 
same time, the system favours equity and might decrease the use of leverage. Another 
advantage is that the system will not create a need to increase corporate tax rate or any other 
tax rate in order to maintain the total tax income at government level. The system might in 
fact allow for a decrease in the corporate tax rate, which might attract FDI and general 
investment in the jurisdiction. Simulated studies have shown that this system might lead to a 
fall in both investments and GDP, caused by the increased cost of capital.187 
 BEPS – Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 10.3
In a European Commission MEMO188 they focus on the “honest” citizens who have to carry 
a heavier tax burden when businesses engage in aggressive tax planning and tax avoidance 
schemes. The mobility of money grows along with the technology. So do the possibilities of 
shifting profit across borders. National tax laws have not been adapted in order to prevent 
loopholes that can be exploited by MNCs in order to avoid taxes. The G20 Finance Ministers 
requested something to be done about this. This was the trigger following the creation of the 
Action plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) launched by the OECD. This plan 
involves 15 actions that will equip governments with the international and domestic 
instruments to face this challenge. As of July 2013, the G20 Finance Ministers and Central 
Bank Governors endorsed this action plan fully. The BEPS action plan is scheduled in three 
phases ending up with the final phase in December 2015. 189 
Some of the main principles are to improve the tax administration and tax collection in 
developing countries. The action plan also involves the re-establishment of the global 
                                                
187 Mooij et al. 2008 
188 European Commission; 05.12.13 
189 OECD, 2014 
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coherence of government income taxation with a goal to increase transparency, predictability 
and certainty and to make the information exchange among global tax authorities automatic. 
The OECD divides these main principles into 15 actions.190  
Overall it aims to end the use of shell companies, which are used to save profits offshore and 
to cancel schemes that shift profit offshore. 191 
 A Look at Canada 10.4
Canada was at the forefront introducing thin capitalization rules way back in 1971.192 We 
will therefore see how the Canadian government has combatted international tax evasion and 
aggressive tax avoidance. First of all, the country has an extensive tax treaty network. Since 
2006, the Canadian government has audited almost 8000 cases of aggressive tax planning 
rounding up to approximately CAD$4.6bn in unpaid tax.193 With initiative like BEPS and 
FATCA we believe that this will be reduced. 
If countries worldwide commit to the BEPS and FATCA and their guidelines, we will 
observe an effect in increased tax payments. As of today there is a large amount of cash 
stacked in offshore companies, however, we lack information on the BEPS and FATCA 
effect as they have been implemented relatively recently.  
Countries have great intentions fighting tax avoidance using tax havens and sophisticated 
schemes. We have described some regulations and actions taken by governments in this 
chapter, and it will be interesting to see their future effect.	  	  
	  
                                                
190 Freehills et al. 2013 
191 OECD 2014 
192 Ruf and Schindler, 2012 
193 Canada Revenue Agency, 2013 
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 The Failed Tax Holiday 10.5
In 2004, the American government enacted a repatriation tax holiday, allowing companies to 
bring home foreign profits at a tax rate of 5,25%, instead of the normal 35%. This was done 
in an attempt to get money back into a struggling American economy, and to increase 
investments and spending. During this tax holiday, $363 bn. went back to the United States 
according to the Internal Revenue Service,194 and $312 billion of these were eligible for the 
reduced tax rate.195 The amount repatriated equalled 45% of registered profits held abroad, 
and Hewlett-Packard was one of the companies taking full advantage of the possibility, 
bringing home $14,5 bn. of a total $15 bn. held abroad.  
There are mixed views on the effect of this tax holiday, and a report released by the U.S. 
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations and its chairman Carl Levin, states that 
the tax holiday did not produce the promised benefits of new jobs or increased research 
expenditures to spur economic growth.196 The report found an increase in both executive pay 
and stock buy-backs among the 15 companies that repatriated the largest amounts during the 
tax holiday. These companies decreased their R&D spending’s in the years after the tax 
break, and after repatriating a total of $155 bn., these companies reduced their workforce by 
close to 21 000 jobs. The effects where the opposite of what was expected, and the fact is 
that because the MNCs now expect occasional tax breaks like this one, even more profit than 
before has been shifted offshore. The estimated costs for the U.S. Treasury were close to 
$3,3 bn., and Levin strongly recommends not to introduce a new tax break, believing that it 
will only benefit a small group of corporations, creating a significant revenue loss, a failure 
to create jobs and more incentives for MNCs to move even more jobs and investments 
offshore. 
 
                                                
194 IRS; March 2012 
195 Coy & Drucker; March 17th 2011 
196 Levin, Carl; October 11th 2011 
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 The progress 10.6
“No Results without cross-border cooperation”-European commission 2013 
The European commission has launched several actions with the intention of reducing 
MNC’s tax avoidance. In 2013 the European commission proposed extending the automatic 
information exchange between EU countries (MEMO/13/533)197. The G20 Finance 
Ministers gave a green light in February 2014 to a new global standard that aims to fight tax 
evasion as well as improving global tax transparency.198 This standard was developed by the 
OECD with support from the EU. 
The EU has recently launched a policy on good governance internationally. Regardless, the 
European commission estimates that €1 trillion is being lost from public finances as a 
consequence of avoidance and evasion and says that more needs to be done in order to 
protect government revenues. 199 
Among other, we find initiatives on the European commission webpage as: 
• Digital taxation debate 
• Fight VAT fraud with agreeing on new instruments 
• Publish a new report on the VAT gap in the EU 
• Increase company transparency 
 
One obvious challenge is to get everyone on the same team. If only one country deviates 
from the norm, MNCs will still have the possibility to avoid EU, OECD and the European 
commission’s actions. 
	  
                                                
197 European commission; 12.06.13 
198 European commission; 23.02.13 
199 European commission; 15.05.12 
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 New Rules to Stop Debt Shifting Through Shell-10.7
Companies 
Ever since 1990, the EU´s Parent-subsidiary Directive has existed in order to prevent the risk 
of double taxation within companies operating in different EU-countries. Some companies 
have however been able to find loopholes in the directive, giving them an advantageous 
"double non-taxation". By using certain types of internal debt, as described in chapter 4, the 
payments on these types of debt end up being treated as tax-deductible debt payments in one 
country and tax exempt dividends in another, meaning that the company ends up paying little 
or no tax on income made in certain subsidiaries. The European Commission has proposed a 
new law, stating that a company will have to pay taxes on incoming payments, if these 
payments have been deducted in the other country, aiming to prevent the use of such internal 
loans. The law will also work to prevent companies from creating subsidiaries in EU-
countries solely to exploit local tax laws. The new directive is supposed to be implemented 
by December 2014.200The leaders of the G-8 countries also addressed these problems when 
they met in Northern Ireland in June 2013. They created a declaration that included 
increased openness between both countries and companies, where information regarding 
ownership and location of income was to be known by each jurisdictions government.201 
As we have seen throughout this thesis, the use of shell-companies in tax havens and in high-
secrecy jurisdictions has become a widely used tax minimization strategy, and is causing 
huge losses in tax income for various governments around the world. Companies are 
generally allowed to create foreign affiliates whenever and wherever they want, being that 
any restrictions from governments might reduce the companies overall willingness to invest. 
The main problem is the lack of transparency and openness in some jurisdictions, allowing 
shell-companies with no real business activity to exist. In order to solve this problem, global 
transparency standards needs to be implemented, and the activity in all existing subsidiaries 
needs to be measured and reported continuously. Technology might help to increase 
openness, and a global network of information exchange could make the job easier for tax 
authorities.202 The most important thing is however to get all countries and jurisdictions on 
                                                
200 European Commission; 25.11.13 
201 Lough Erne Declaration; 18.6.13 
202 The Economist; 10.5.14 
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board, and the development regarding the FATCA agreement has ignited new hope and 
proved that this might be possible.	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11. Final Conclusion 
In this thesis we have explained the various tax minimization strategies available to MNCs 
and the theories behind these, and we have shown empirical evidence that these strategies 
are in fact being frequently used internationally.  
By analysing two large MNCs we have been able to see how some of these strategies are 
used in a real life setting. We have found that both The Coca-Cola Company and IKEA use 
several of the methods we described in chapter 4, where the use of tax havens, high secrecy 
jurisdictions and advanced corporate structures with shell companies are the most obvious 
strategies. We were able to find information on IKEA´s use of royalty payments, and a 
strong indication of thin capitalization strategies, but we were lacking information to find 
any direct proof that the two companies use strategies involving transfer pricing. Our 
findings suggests that the two companies use several tax minimization strategies 
aggressively, and as we can see from the figure below, and from the information in the 
analysis, they are both ending up paying a low effective tax rate on their earnings.  
Figure 11.1 	  
We have also been discussing the actors creating these loopholes for the MNCs, and the 
moral aspects of tax minimization. The fact that the employees of some of the big firms that 
are making money out of the tax loopholes, are actually the ones advising the tax authorities 
in the creation of new tax laws, is an obvious problem that needs to be dealt with. We have 
pointed out that a global consensus towards taxation, and a global agreement in dealing with 
 117 
financial information to increase transparency is needed. Tax avoidance has been given 
increased attention in recent years, and it seems like changes are about to be made. FATCA, 
ACE, CBIT and BEPS are some of the actions aimed to prevent tax avoidance, and with all 
EU countries now on board for a new global transparency standard, we might be getting 
close to a solution.  
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12. Attachment 
 Attachment A  12.1
IKANO	  GROUP:	  
	  
IKEA	  GROUP:	  
	  
Both	  tables	  are	  from	  Orbis	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